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The degradation of aging energy infrastructure systems has the potential to increase the 
risk of failure, resulting in power outage and costly unplanned maintenance work. 
Therefore, the development of scientific and cost-effective life cycle management (LCM) 
strategies has become increasingly important to maintain energy infrastructure. Since 
degradation of aging equipment is an uncertain process which depends on many factors, a 
risk-based approach is required to consider the effect of various uncertainties in LCM. 
The thesis presents probabilistic models to support risk-based life cycle management 
of energy infrastructure systems. In addition to uncertainty in degradation process, the 
inspection data collected by the energy industry is often censored and truncated which 
make it difficult to estimate the lifetime probability distribution of the equipment. The 
thesis presents modern statistical techniques in quantifying uncertainties associated with 
inspection data and to estimate the lifetime distributions in a consistent manner.  
Age-based and sequential inspection-based replacement models are proposed for 
maintenance of component in a large-distribution network. A probabilistic lifetime model 
to consider the effect of imperfect preventive maintenance of a component is developed 
and its impact to maintenance optimization is illustrated. 
The thesis presents a stochastic model for the pitting corrosion process in steam 
generators (SG), which is a serious form of degradation in SG tubing of some nuclear 
generating stations. The model is applied to estimate the number of tubes requiring 
plugging and the probability of tube leakage in an operating period. The application and 
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The expected or mean time to reach failure is defined as life expectancy. Failure need not 
be a physical failure but could also mean a failure to perform the intended function. 
 
Maintenance 
Maintenance is defined as restoring the component/system in its functional state. 




Risk includes the notions of probability of an unfavourable event or hazard and the 
consequence of the event in economic or human terms. Risk is commonly represented as 
Risk = (Probability of failure) × (consequence of failure). In this thesis risk is measured 
in terms of expected cost ($CAD). 
 
Optimization 
Optimization is the use of specific technique to determine the most cost effective solution 
to a problem. 
 
Renewal Process 
A renewal process is an idealized stochastic model for "events" that occur randomly in 
time (generically called renewals or arrivals). The basic mathematical assumption is that 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The structure of energy infrastructure (nuclear, hydro) in North America has 
undergone a transition to a competitive, market-driven industry which operates as 
an independent business enterprise. This enterprise must be a cost-effective 
energy producer that maximizes economic returns for investors. The executive 
management at both the corporate and the plant level holds greater responsibility 
to provide a safe, reliable, and affordable supply of energy for consumers and 
prudently manage the investment of shareholders.  
The power blackout in August 2003 affected 50 million people over eight 
states in the US and most parts of Ontario. The blackout highlighted the 
vulnerability of the electric grid to massive failures, giving new impetus to calls 
for more regulatory standards and enforcement in the power industry (US-Canada 
Report, 2004). The degradation of aging energy infrastructure has the potential to 
increase the risk of failure, resulting in power outage and costly unplanned 
maintenance work. The sources of uncertainty are the degree to which asset 
condition and performance degrade with age, economic uncertainties, and 
increasingly strict environmental regulations. Today, the energy infrastructure has 
realized that the key to enhancing asset performance, longevity, and profitability 
in our uncertain world is the formal implementation or enhancement of Life Cycle 
Management (LCM) practices. 
The major advantage of LCM is that it provides decision-making tools and 
information in a planned, systematic, and timely way, streamlining the decision-
making process in any future crises. LCM (EPRI 1998) is a process that combines 
the following two requirements:  
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• aging management, that is maintaining costly to replace components and 
structures and preventing their long term aging related degradation or failures 
which affect the asset performance  or useful life,  
• asset management, that is plant valuation, resource allocation, and 
investment strategies that account for economic, technical, regulatory, and 
environmental uncertainties. 
LCM involves the prediction of maintenance, repair, and the associated costs 
far into the future and the impact of other costs on asset value. LCM creates the 
opportunity of reducing costs and adding value to assets through increased 
production and revenue. Although LCM aids in the successful operation of energy 
infrastructure, it also becomes crucial in a competitive environment that places 
emphasis on future risk and performance.  
1.2 Research Motivation 
Life cycle management is a framework to manage the long-term performance of 
ageing infrastructure systems. The success of LCM depends on the understanding 
of uncertainties, on quantifying them, and on developing strategies to minimize 
them. The degradation of aging equipment is an uncertain process which depends 
on many factors. A risk-based approach is therefore essential for efficient life 
cycle management because it accounts for various uncertainties in quantifying 
them.  
The large uncertainty inherent in equipment degradation means that 
equipment lifetime is a random variable. A complete record of equipment 
lifetimes is rarely available from industry to estimate true lifetime distribution. It 
is neither practical nor economically feasible to perform frequent and intensive 
inspections of infrastructure systems. The inspection data collected by industry 
under conventional practices provide limited and indirect information about 
equipment lifetimes. Such inspection data complicate the estimation of equipment 
lifetime under real-service conditions.  
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The literature is deficient in information on the practical problems in 
developing probability models from partial inspection studies, which usually 
involve incomplete data for estimating life time models. This research examines 
such issues and attempts to develop probabilistic models based on incomplete 
inspection observations.  
Energy infrastructure consists of a large inventory of equipment that plays a 
significant role in overall asset management of the infrastructure system. 
Maintenance of large aging infrastructures is a major problem that asset managers 
continue to face. The inspection of equipment in a large infrastructure network is 
a fairly time consuming and costly undertaking compared with overall 
replacement cost. Therefore, asset management models are needed for making 
best decisions on inspection and replacement strategies, to account for costs and 
risks over the life cycle of an asset.  
In the nuclear industry, many aging reactors are experiencing increasing 
degradation. For example, steam generators (SG), which are a critical component 
of nuclear power plants, experience various degradation mechanisms affecting SG 
tubes, such as stress corrosion cracking, fretting, pitting, denting, erosion-
corrosion, fatigue, wastage, wear, and thinning (IAEA, 1997).  A detailed 
understanding of degradation mechanisms, as well as methods for assessing and 
mitigating degradation, is essential to ensure the structural integrity and reliable 
SG systems. 
Various in-service inspection techniques are used to monitor the extent of 
degradation in SGs. The uncertainty in quantifying defect sizes using standard 
inspection tools affects the estimation of degradation model. The inspection data 
required for estimating degradation is also limited by a scarcity of data due to 
workplace constraints imposed by radiation exposure and poor access to 
components in a nuclear reactor. To obtain suitable data, engineers often pool the 
data from similar equipments working under similar conditions. The unobserved 
heterogeneity within pooled data can be quantified using frailty models (Lawless, 
2003). Probabilistic modelling of degradation mechanisms considering various 
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uncertainties is required for a best estimate of risk-of-failure in a future operating 
period.  
The motivation for this research comes from the need to develop better 
probabilistic models than currently available, to support risk-based life cycle 
management plans in energy infrastructure systems. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to develop probabilistic models to support life 
cycle management of energy infrastructure systems. Emphasis is placed on 
modelling the uncertainties in inspection data collected from energy systems. The 
objectives of the thesis are  
• To estimate lifetime distributions from incomplete lifetime observations 
commonly encountered in field inspections. 
• To discuss applications in energy infrastructure, namely utility wood poles, oil 
circuit breakers, insulators, and feeder pipes; then conduct comprehensive 
statistical analysis and interpretation of actual inspection data collected by 
industry. 
• To develop a probability model of asset management for making optimum 
maintenance decisions. 
• To develop a probabilistic life cycle management model for pitting corrosion 
degradation in steam generators 
• To develop probability models to account for detection and measurement 
errors associated with inspection data 
• To discuss the application of pitting corrosion model to a Steam Generator in 
the context of Life cycle management. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the background, 
research motivation, and objectives of the research. Chapter 2 outlines the scope 
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of probabilistic modelling in the context of life cycle management (LCM). The 
concept of LCM in energy infrastructure is discussed along with the EPRI LCM 
process. The main concerns about LCM, namely aging management and asset 
management, are discussed along with distinctive objectives. Various 
maintenance practices as well as current probabilistic asset management practices 
are reviewed. 
Chapter 3 presents comprehensive statistical techniques used in lifetime data 
analysis, taking into account incomplete inspection data. The chapter explores 
various types of incomplete data encountered from the inspection of components 
in power utilities. The applications discussed in this chapter focus on interpreting 
incomplete data and the related effects on estimating the realistic lifetime 
distributions. Estimating lifetime distributions from strongly censored 
observations is not a straightforward task. The Maximum Likelihood method can 
be used to estimate the lifetime distributions from various types of incomplete 
data. The chapter discusses the use of statistical methods in interpreting censored 
data usually encountered during field inspections.  
The snap shot data on wood pole condition in an inspection campaign 
collected by the power utility is considered for lifetime analysis. The data are 
interpreted assuming different models on lifetimes to produce realistic estimates 
on pole lifetime distribution. The sensitivity of using different parametric 
distributions is also discussed, as are censoring models. The uncertainty among 
observed poles is also accounted for by using frailty models for lifetime 
distribution analysis.  
Other applications in energy infrastructure are explored, namely oil circuit 
breakers, electric insulators, and feeder pipes in which the inspection data 
collected is limited in estimating realistic lifetime distribution. 
Chapter 4 presents the application of probability models in asset management 
for maintenance decisions in the context of a distributed component population. 
The optimal age-based refurbishment policy for wood pole management is 
demonstrated as a function of life cycle cost. Next, a sequential condition-based 
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replacement policy for a distributed population is presented to show the effect of 
inspection interval in estimating the maintenance cost, risk, and life cycle cost. 
The component replacement (Corrective Replacement) policy from the renewal 
theory framework is demonstrated in estimating the expected future replacement 
costs.  The use of lifetime distribution in maintenance optimization of imperfect 
preventive maintenance is presented. To account for imperfect preventive 
maintenance, a probabilistic model is proposed using the concept of virtual age. 
The effect of a maintenance interval under imperfect maintenance conditions is 
illustrated by the use of lifetime distribution of equipment. 
In Chapter 5, a pitting corrosion model is proposed, based on the data 
obtained from the eddy current inspection of steam generator tubing in a nuclear 
generating station. Background information on the process of pitting corrosion 
and probabilistic modelling is presented. An overview of life cycle management 
issues in steam generators (SGs) of nuclear power plants is presented, and a need 
for efficient life cycle management decisions based on the current degradation of 
SGs is discussed. 
The rate of pit generation is modeled as the non homogeneous Poisson 
process, which belongs to the class of stochastic birth process models. The 
parameters of the pit generation process are estimated by taking into account 
censored observations as well as non-censored observations. The pit depth 
distribution exceeding a threshold pit depth is modeled as the generalized Pareto 
distribution (GPD), which falls in the class of extreme value distribution. Details 
of the probabilistic model development, along with parametric estimation and the 
derivation of the extreme pit depth model, are discussed.  
Uncertainties associated with pit depth measurements from an eddy current 
inspection process are discussed.  The effect of measurement error and probability 
of detection on pit depth measurements is discussed by conducting a simulation 
study. The effect of sampling uncertainty from different SG inspections plans is 
explored. Simulation analysis is conducted to estimate the probability of tube leak 
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and expected number of tubes plugged in next outage, using data from different 
inspection plans.  
In Chapter 6, the developed methodology is applied to the corrosion pit data 
obtained from a nuclear generating station. The application and the benefits of the 
model are illustrated in the context of steam generator life cycle management. 
Maintenance optimization on the chemical cleaning cycle for a SG pitting 
corrosion degradation is presented. 
Chapter 7 concludes the research findings, which aim to meet the research 
objectives presented in Chapter 1. This chapter discusses further the research 
contributions towards probabilistic modelling of life cycle management. The 




CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 LCM Definition 
A formal definition of LCM is “integration of operations, maintenance, 
engineering, regulatory, environmental and business activities that 
• Manage asset condition 
• Optimize operating life 
• Maximize plant value while maintaining plant safety. 
The two major elements of asset management are physical asset management 
and financial asset management. Physical asset management involves the 
improvement of asset condition by managing the maintenance and aging of 
equipment. Financial asset management involves maximizing the asset value 
through increasing revenues, reducing costs, and optimizing resource allocation 
and risk management.  
 
Figure 2.1: Concept of LCM Planning 
The main benefits of implementing LCM are 
• Increase in long-term profitability 
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• Reduced outages 
• Improved business planning practices 
• Reduced operations & maintenance costs 
• Improved plant safety, reliability and availability 
• Assessment of  potential aging mechanisms that add to long-term risks 
• Addressing obsolescence 
• Improved economic forecasts 
An LCM plan is a long-term strategy for preventive maintenance, 
replacement, and redesign of systems, structures and components (SSCs), all 
important to safety and reliability and to the contribution of SSCs to plant value. 
LCM plans generally consist of maintenance activities, and their schedule and 
costs over a planned plant life.  LCM planning facilitates evaluation of 
maintenance options and what-if scenarios, assesses business risk, and considers 
the economic consequences of lost power.  
2.2 LCM Concepts 
2.2.1 EPRI LCM Process 
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is an independent, non-profit, 
industry-wide collaborative research center that promotes public interest on 
energy. EPRI has developed cost-effective technology for safe and 
environmentally friendly electricity generation that maximizes profitable 
utilization of existing nuclear assets and supports promotion and development of 
new technology.  
EPRI released implementation guides and demonstration reports on the LCM 
of plant SSCs, introducing advanced concepts and describing the various steps of 
the LCM process. The information needed to produce an LCM plan for most 
SSCs is provided through EPRI LCM sourcebooks. The objective of these 
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sourcebooks is to provide engineers with foundation information, data, sample 
plans, and guidance to produce long-term LCM plans for their SSCs.   
The LCM planning process consists of four main stages, as shown in Figure 
2.2. The first stage is the selection of SSCs important to plant safety, reliability, 
and economics. EPRI (2001) suggests several formal approaches in evaluating 
and ranking important SSCs for nuclear power plants. Once important SSCs are 
identified, depending on the level of criticality, LCM plans are developed for each 
level of SSCs. The LCM planning flow chart in Figure 2.2 shows the activities 
involved in each stage of the process.  
Before conducting an aging assessment, the scope and functions of the SSC 
are defined. This information is required to plan for alternative aging management 
strategies to meet the scope and functions of SSC. The next step is to gather 
relevant technical information related to plant performance and operating history 
and review past and current maintenance plans. Using the technical information 
gathered, an aging assessment is conducted on the SSCs, and alternate LCM plans 
are identified. The relevant cost and failure rate data are obtained to assess the 
performance and costs of each alternative LCM plan. Planned and unplanned 
costs are taken into account to evaluate the economic value of each alternative 
LCM plan. Finally, an optimum SSC LCM plan is selected based on the level of 
safety, reliability and economics over the life of the facility. The optimum LCM 
approach is a function of the projected life of the facility. If the target life is not 
specified, then an economic analysis must be performed over a range of facility 
life options.  
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SSC Selection and Classification for LCM Planning
Select SSCs for LCM planning
Determine appropriate LCM planning level
LCM Technical Evaluation
Specify scope, boundaries and functions
Collect relevant technical information
Conduct performance and aging assessment
Identify candidate LCM plan alternatives
LCM Economic and Strategic Planning Evaluations
Obtain or develop failure rate and cost data
Assess performance & cost of LCM plan alternatives
Select optimum SSC level LCM plan
Implementation of SSC LCM Plans
Enter SSC level plans into plant roll-up budget
Review and approve SSC level plans
Implement plans and track performance
 
Figure 2.2: Simplified EPRI LCM planning flowchart 
2.2.2 Asset Management  
Asset management is a business philosophy designed to align corporate goals 
with asset-level spending decisions. The term asset management is derived from 
the financial industry, where its concepts are applied to investment portfolios 
containing stocks, bonds, cash, options and other financial instruments. Financial 
asset management techniques are used to achieve an acceptable level of risk while 
 12
maximizing expected profits. Many techniques of financial asset management are 
applicable to infrastructure asset management. 
Today, the power industry is divided so that generation, transmission, and 
distribution are run as separate businesses. To resolve issues like slow load 
growth, aging equipment, depleting rate bases, rate freezes, and regulatory 
uncertainties, the power sectors are exploring ways to increase earnings, credit 
ratings and stock price. As the power industry is asset intensive, asset 
management is considered as an effective way of improving conditions in these 
fundamental areas.  
In asset management, decisions are made to maximize profits and 
performance by effectively managing risks and reducing capital spending. The 
framework for asset management as described by Brown and Spare (2004) is a 
process of concern to the asset owner, asset manager and service provider. The 
asset owner sets the business values, corporate strategy, and corporate objective in 
terms of cost, performance, and risk. The asset manager identifies the best way to 
achieve these objectives and lays a multi-year asset plan. The service provider 
executes the plan efficiently, and feeds back asset and performance data into the 
asset management process. 
Effective asset management strategies can be achieved by the prudent 
understanding of and accounting for various uncertainties and risks. The risk from 
various sources should be quantified so as to develop strategies that can reduce 
uncertainties. Asset management is applied to both physical components and 
financial components (EPRI, 1998). Physical asset management focuses on 
uncertainties in equipment performance, maintenance, and operations. The 
operations and maintenance of aging components is monitored through aging 
management in such a way as to maintain safety and minimize life cycle costs. 
The financial asset management concerns uncertainties in market prices, cost 
estimates, discount rates, and various regulations in order to increase revenue, 
reduce costs, and minimize risks.   
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2.2.3 Aging Management 
Aging management is a part of LCM that is concerned with operations and 
maintenance actions to control aging of equipment and performance with the aim 
to maintain safety and minimize life cycle costs. Aging management involves 
major decisions on equipment repair, replacement, and the consequences for 
equipment failure or outage that results in substantial investments. To make such 
decisions effective, quality data on equipment condition and proper aging 
assessments are needed.  
Maintenance is a part of the overall concept of asset management. Its goal is 
to increase the duration of useful component life and postpone failures that would 
require expensive repairs. Maintenance involves costs, and this fact is taken into 
account in choosing the most cost-effective policy. The costs of maintenance are 
balanced against the benefits from increased performance or reduced risks. 
Details of maintenance polices and the present polices in the electric power 
industry are discussed in a paper by IEEE Task Force (2001). 
The importance of maintenance has been growing over the years. In this 
modern era of mechanization and automation, maintenance plays a vital role and 
is the largest department in any organization. In fact, maintenance is becoming an 
important part of asset management (Endrenyi, et al., 2001). The sophistication of 
equipment has increased the impact of unplanned downtimes caused by system 
failures. Today, the impact of system downtimes is unacceptably high and has to 
be reduced with proper maintenance planning. By performing little maintenance, 
system performance is reduced and may result in costly system failures. On the 
contrary, if maintenance is increased, system performance could increase, but the 
cost of maintenance will be high.  
A maintenance model is a mathematical model by which both costs and 
benefits of maintenance are quantified and by which an optimum balance between 
both of them is achieved. Often norms have to be set to define failure and the 
benefits of maintenance, and therefore they are more difficult to quantify. In this 
case, one has to minimize maintenance costs in order to meet these norms. The 
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maintenance objectives as summarized by Dekkar (1996) are aimed at ensuring 
system function; ensuring system life; ensuring safety; and ensuring human well-
being. 
2.3 Technical Methods Needed to Support LCM 
2.3.1 Overview of Maintenance Practices 
The early application of maintenance management dates back to the 1950s and 
60s. At that time, maintenance actions were mainly predefined activities carried 
out at fixed intervals called scheduled maintenance. These were meant to reduce 
system failures and unplanned system downtime. However, such a maintenance 
policy may be quite inefficient as it may be costly in the long run (Barlow and 
Proschan, 1965) and may not greatly extend system lifetime. In the 70s condition 
monitoring came forward, focusing on techniques which predict failures using 
information on the actual state of the equipment (predictive maintenance) 
(Mobley, 2002, Makis et al., 1998, Barata, et al., 2002, Jardine, et al., 1999). This 
approach proved to be more effective than scheduled maintenance. Detailed 
studies about the failure of equipment created a better understanding of failure 
mechanisms, resulting in better designs.  But such applications are not popular in 
decision-making analysis (Dekkar, 1996).  
The key approach popular in industry is the Reliability Centred Maintenance 
(RCM) (Moubray, 1997). In an RCM approach, various alternative maintenance 
policies can be compared and the most cost-effective for sustaining equipment 
reliability is selected (Vatn et al., 1996). It can be regarded as the more qualitative 
approach to maintenance, in which optimization models are quantitative approach. 
However, this approach is more heuristic and needs expert judgment at various 
steps. The reason various models are being proposed in the literature is to aid the 
maintenance scheduling, depending on the problem. 
Several maintenance models are discussed in the literature (Barlow and 
Proschan, 1965, Dekkar, 1996, Endrenyi, 2001). The most popular maintenance 
models are discussed here. 
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2.3.1.1 Corrective Replacement 
Corrective replacement is a simple and straightforward policy; when a component 
fails it is replaced by a new one or repaired to working condition. This technique 
is often called reactive maintenance or corrective maintenance (Mobley, 2002). 
No maintenance task is needed till the system fails, which means no money is 
spent on maintenance. The maintenance staff must be prepared for the any type of 
failure, which may be anything from replacing a few components to a complete 
overhaul. The major expenses associated with this type of maintenance are high 
inventory cost, high overtime labour cost, high machine downtime, and low 
production availability. However, this technique results in high maintenance costs 
in the long run and lower system availability.  
2.3.1.2 Age Replacement and Block Replacement policy 
In age replacement policy, the system is replaced either at a certain age or when it 
fails, whichever comes first. In block replacement policy, the system is replaced 
either at fixed intervals or when the system fails. These methods are extensively 
discussed in the literature and are still practiced. The optimal age replacement is 
more profitable than the optimum block replacement. But when the emergency 
failure costs are the same, the cost of a preventive maintenance carried out at 
preplanned time, as in block replacement, will be smaller than the corresponding 
preventive maintenance for age replacement (Gertsbakh, 2000).  
2.3.1.3 Minimal Repair Policy 
In the minimal repair policy technique, the system is subjected to minimal repair 
when the system fails, and replacements are done at fixed intervals. This method 
is different from block replacement, whereby the system is repaired when failure 
occurs (Vatn et al., 1996). It is commonly assumed that the system after 
preventive maintenance is either as good as new (perfect maintenance) or as bad 
as old (minimal maintenance). In reality, these assumptions are not particularly 
true, so such maintenance actions are termed imperfect maintenance (Mettas and 
Zhao, 2005). Minimal repair or imperfect maintenance actions restore the system 
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to an operating state, but there is also a risk of failure or outage in future 
operation. This policy may be prudent when there is a need to postpone relatively 
high refurbishment policy in order to extend the useful life. 
2.3.1.4 Predictive maintenance 
In preventive maintenance, maintenance is carried when needed. The need for 
maintenance is established through periodic or continuous inspection. To perform 
meaningful periodic inspections, diagnostic routines and techniques are required 
to help identify disorders that call for maintenance (Mobley, 2002). The aging 
mechanisms are identified from periodic or continuous inspection to understand 
the extent of degradation and use proper mechanistic or probabilistic models to 
predict the future state of degradation. This approach may suggest the right 
preventive maintenance action when needed. Predictive maintenance could be a 
cost effective alternative when it is correctly implemented. If the consequences of 
equipment failure are high and when the periodic inspection is feasible and less 
costly, predictive maintenance may result in a cost-effective alternative. 
2.3.1.5 Periodic Inspection 
Commonly used diagnostic methods include visual inspection, optical inspection, 
neutron analysis, radiography, eddy current testing, ultrasonic testing, vibration 
analysis, lubricant analysis, temperature analysis, magnetic flux leakage analysis, 
and acoustic emission monitoring. Each of these methods has advantages and 
limitations. 
In some cases, when periodic inspection cannot reveal the actual status of the 
equipment or when it is not feasible to conduct periodic inspection, condition 
monitoring is preferred. When the cost of implementing condition monitoring is 
not excessive, this method proves to be more economical than maintenance based 
on regular inspection. 
Other maintenance models discussed in the literature are total predictive 
maintenance (TPM) and reliability centered maintenance (RCM) (Dekkar, 1996, 
Mobley, 2002). TPM was developed by Deming in the late 1950s, which is meant 
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to improve system effectiveness. RCM is based on regular assessments of 
equipment condition; it involves system analysis like FMEA (Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis) and an investigation on system operating needs and priorities.  
Maintenance models are classified according to the deterioration model 
(Dekkar, 1996). 
1. Deterministic Models 
2. Stochastic Models 
 A. Under Risk 
 B. Under Uncertainty. 
The deterioration process is represented by a sequence of stages of increasing 
wear, finally leading to system failure. Deterioration is of course a continuous 
process, and only for the purpose of easier modeling may it be considered in 
discrete steps. The difference between risk and uncertainty is that risk assumes 
that the probability distribution of the time to failure is available, which is not so 
for uncertainty. In some models, system failure can occur not only because of 
excessive degradation, which leads to critical state of the system, but also because 
of random shocks which suddenly fail the system and whose occurrence 
probability is degradation dependent. These models are often solved using 
Markov or semi-Markov models (Smilowitz and Madanat, 2000, Barata et al., 
2002) and Gamma process models (Yuan et al., 2006, Frangopol et al., 2004). The 
probabilistic modeling of degradation mechanisms and the effects of maintenance 
on equipment performance and life cycle costs demand effective LCM. 
2.3.2 Current Probabilistic Asset Management Practices 
Traditionally, the electric power utilities employed preventive maintenance 
programs to keep their assets in good condition as long as the process was 
economical. Given the present economic constraints, an efficient maintenance 
program has become an important part of asset management. Various electric 
power organizations in different countries have begun to implement asset 
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management to meet the demands of the present market (Brown and Spare, 2004, 
Morton, 1999, Endrenyi et al., 1998, Bertling et al., 2005). This has recently led to 
the development of various asset management frameworks and supporting 
models.   
In power distribution systems, two methods are developed to address the 
effect of maintenance on system reliability (Endrenyi et al., 2004), namely RCAM 
(Reliability Centered Asset Maintenance) and ASSP (Asset Sustainment Strategy 
Platform). Both approaches analyze the choice of a component maintenance 
policy in a system context. The activities involve system reliability evaluation, 
prioritization of component maintenance based on component criticality, effect of 
various component maintenance policies on system reliability, and life cycle costs. 
It is said that the conventional RCM (Reliability centered Maintenance) is 
generally not capable of showing the benefits of maintenance for system 
reliability and costs (Bertling et al., 2005). 
2.3.2.1 RCAM (Reliability Centered Asset Maintenance) 
The RCAM method is developed for asset maintenance in electric power 
distribution systems (Bertling et al., 2005). In this method, the failure events are 
assumed to occur randomly, and therefore the models are based on probability 
theory. A network modeling technique is applied to calculate system reliability by 
the minimal cut set approach. A computer code RADPOW (reliability assessment 
of electric distribution systems) is used to calculate system reliability and 
sensitivity of the components. For the components which are critical, preventive 
maintenance (PM) strategies are laid out, and the effects of PM and the economic 
analysis are modeled by another program code. These two modules interact with 
each other to assist in arriving at a cost-effective maintenance strategy. 
The failure rate is assumed to be constant, which is an assumption reasonable 
for most electrical components but may not be applicable for components with 
continuous degradation. The effect of maintenance action is modelled by reducing 
the failure rate, to study its impact on overall system reliability. 
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2.3.2.2 ASSP Approach (for Asset Sustainment Strategy Platform) 
The ASSP approach is somewhat similar to RCAM and includes several programs 
which interact as necessary. The reliability evaluation and sensitivity analysis is 
performed by programs REAL and WinAREP (Endrenyi et al., 2004); the critical 
components are ranked and maintenance alternatives are investigated. The effect 
of maintenance is carried out using programs AMP (based on Markov model 
which accounts for deterioration with ageing) (Endrenyi et al., 1998) and first 
passage times FPT (the mean times of failure from any state in the AMP model) 
(Anders and De Silva, 2000). To include the associated costs of maintenance, the 
ASSP platform includes a program called RiBAM (Risk Based Asset 
Management). RiBAM (Anders et al., 2001) uses the information from AMP and 
FPT to construct life curves and cost curves by which cost optimization can be 
performed. 
The Markov model for deterioration is a reasonable conceptual model to 
determine the effect of maintenance. Collecting data periodically on a component 
condition is not always practical in actual field inspections. The estimation of 
transition probabilities in such a model is difficult from field inspection data. 
Hence, in such cases the transition probabilities are usually assumed to reflect the 
model estimates from experience and past data. 
2.3.2.3 Application to Power Infrastructure Systems 
The concept of asset management was introduced recently in the power industry. 
Most of the articles on asset management talk about the scope and advantages of 
the asset management approach in transmission and distribution (Brown and 
Spare, 2004, Butera, 2000, Morton, 1999, Chan, 2004, Wernsing and Dickens, 
2004). Development of probabilistic models for the asset management of 
distribution network has been recently attempted by Endrenyi et al., (2004). Some 
results on the application of asset management techniques in power distribution 
systems are discussed here.  
An asset management of wood pole utility structures (Gustavsen and 
Rolfseng, 2004) is discussed by predicting the pole replacement rate and 
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considering the stochastic variation in pole strength and climate loads. The paper 
describes the probabilistic approach for evaluating the economic impact of 
alternate maintenance strategies, design strategies, and compensation fees for 
undelivered energy. The life prediction and inspection practice for aging wood 
poles is also discussed (Li et al., 2004). The inspection on aging poles is based on 
the current condition of poles and acceptable pole replacement rate for older poles.  
The feasibility of the RCAM approach for circuit breakers is discussed 
(Lindquist et al., 2004). From the statistics collected on circuit breaker failures 
and sub-components, the failure rates are estimated. A probabilistic approach 
based on the condition of the circuit breaker and different levels of maintenance is 
proposed (Natti et al., 2004). The failure, repair and maintenance sequences are 
described as Markov processes, and optimal maintenance intervals are discussed. 
2.3.2.4 Application to Civil Infrastructure Systems 
In the construction industry, operation, maintenance, repair and renewal of assets 
represents a major growing cost in North America (Vanier, 2001). The assets 
range from complex interrelated underground networks to sophisticated buildings 
and roadway systems. Many major asset owners in North America now recognize 
the importance of knowing the current and future states of their infrastructures. 
Asset management plays an important role in maintaining the assets to optimize 
expenditure and maximize the value of the asset over its lifecycle. Managers of 
municipal infrastructures are realizing the need for effective tools and strategies to 
manage the large asset base.  
Application of life-cycle management in civil engineering infrastructures is 
used in rehabilitation/construction alternatives in pavements (Salem et al., 2003) 
and bridges (Kong and Frangopol, 2003). 
2.4 Discussion 
Most of the asset management models discussed in the literature are conceptual in 
nature and do not solve the practical difficulties in modeling the lifetime of the 
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equipment. The models described in Section 2.3.2 are prescriptive and do not 
consider life data obtained from field inspections.  
The equipment in energy infrastructure experience degradation and the 
consequences of equipment failure from such degradation are high. This reality 
has led to the need for evaluation methods for fitness for service assessment of 
equipments. In the nuclear industry, the assessment of the conditional 
probabilities of tube failures, leak rates, and ultimately risk of core damage or of 
exceeding site dose limits is an approach to equipment fitness-for-service 
guidelines that has been used increasingly in recent years. The advantage of 
probabilistic analysis is that it avoids the excessive conservatism typically present 
in deterministic fitness-for-service guidelines (Harris et al., 1997). Probabilistic 
modeling of steam generator tube degradation is typically done only when the 
level of degradation is such that using normal deterministic fitness-for-service 
guidelines would result in the number of tube repairs being sufficiently large to 
affect the power generation capability of the affected unit. 
Development of probabilistic models from inspection data recorded from 
plant outages will allow great confidence in assessing remaining life and in 
ensuring an extended operating life. The literature is deficient in information on 
the practical applications in developing probability models from partial inspection 
studies. 
The rest of this thesis attempts to develop probabilistic models based on 
inspection data. Development of realistic probability models is crucial for making 
credible life cycle management decisions.  
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CHAPTER 3  
LIFETIME DISTRIBUTION MODELS 
3.1 Introduction 
The estimation of lifetime distribution is essential in managing aging equipment 
through a systematic risk based approach. The lifetime distribution of equipment 
is a key input to maintenance models and life cycle cost optimizing models. These 
models are used to quantify the effect of various maintenance actions on the 
equipment performance and associated costs over equipment lifetime. The 
estimation of lifetime distribution hence plays a crucial role in a credible life 
cycle management models.  
Various equipments in civil and energy infrastructures are designed with 
relatively high lifetime and hence the time needed to observe such high lifetimes 
is not practical. Continuous inspection on equipment lifetimes may not be a cost 
effective alternative and hence periodic or non-periodic inspections are performed 
and in some cases there are no inspections. Inspections are mostly affected by the 
safety of the equipment, economics, and accessibility. Such situations often 
results in incomplete observations on equipment lifetimes. Due to increasing 
awareness of the impact of aging equipment has alerted some utilities recently to 
inspect the whole population for the first time creating a snap shot situation on the 
population lifetimes. 
Incomplete observations cannot be ignored as they provide vital information 
on equipment lifetimes. Such incomplete observations pose challenges in both 
estimating and in terms of interpreting lifetime distribution models. This chapter 
discusses various types of incomplete observations and statistical tools to deal 
with incomplete lifetimes in estimating realistic lifetime distribution models.  
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3.2 Types of Data 
3.2.1 Background 
To asses the condition of equipment in its current state and to predict its future 
state needs information on its operating characteristics in its service. Various 
inspection techniques are being used to monitor (periodically or continuously) the 
operating state of the equipment. The objective of inspection can vary depending 
upon the type of equipment and its criticality. Inspection techniques range from 
simple visual inspection to sophisticated Non Destructive Testing (NDT) 
depending on the economics and safety factors. The scope of data collection 
(inspection) is related to the scope of analysis to be performed on equipment over 
its lifetime. Depending on the scope of inspection, the observations could be 
lifetimes of equipment or events over lifetime.  
For example in the case of wood poles, utilities have adopted the 
measurement of the minimum remaining shell thickness of wood pole at the 
ground level as an indicator of pole condition. The shell thickness can be reliably 
estimated using the Resistograph. Typically, a pole is considered to be at the end 
of service life when its minimum shell thickness is reduced to less than 2 inches 
(Newbill, 1993). Such a pole is referred to as a substandard pole, which has a 
higher risk of failure under an adverse environmental overloading. The age at 
which a pole reaches the substandard condition is designated as the end of life 
(EOL). One of the applications discussed in this chapter is based on the wood 
pole inspection data collected by a utility.  
The condition of steam generator of a nuclear power plant is assessed by 
means of eddy current inspection of steam generator tubes during outages. The 
objective of eddy current inspection is to monitor various degradation 
mechanisms and characterize the defects during outages. In case of pitting 
corrosion degradation, the number of corrosion pits and depth of pits are observed 
at each outage. The extent of degradation which is characterized by the pit 
generation and pit depth defines the service life (lifetime) of the steam generator. 
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In such cases there is a need to quantify the uncertainties in observing inspection 
data. 
Observations may be done differently depending on factors such as the time 
needed to observe events that define equipment state, the feasibility of following 
equipment over time, and the mechanism for recording relevant data on 
equipment condition. Such factors create situations where the observations are 
censored, truncated, and categorical. The information on such observations should 
be carefully accounted in order to reliably asses/model the equipment 
characteristics.  
This section deals with the conceptual modeling of inspection data 
encountered in practices that are accounted for in the statistical modeling of 
lifetimes. Firstly a standard data analysis is described to estimate the lifetime 
distribution given a sample of complete lifetimes. Then a distinction is drawn 
between the standard case and the realistic case of censored inspection data 
collected by electrical utilities. 
3.2.2 Complete Lifetime Data 
Complete lifetimes of components are obtained from such follow up studies. The 
standard method of estimating the lifetime distribution is based on the cohort 
analysis technique (Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1999). In an ideal analysis a 
single cohort of in-service components is monitored regularly over a long span of 
time until all the components reach the end of life. As an illustration, Figure 3.1 
shows components installed in a particular year (say 1970) continuously followed 
until the entire cohort ceases to exist. It is also referred to as a “longitudinal 
survey” in health sciences and demography literature (Lawless, 2003, Keyfitz, 
1985). Statistical analysis of such data is quite simple which is shown in Section 
3.3.3. 
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Figure 3.1: An ideal cohort data of complete service lifetimes 
This approach is ideally suitable for components of low cost and short life 
span. However, a complete sample of lifetime data from a single cohort of wood 
pole is not easy to obtain. The reason is that it requires continuous follow up 
inspection and assessment of a large number of poles from their installation over a 
long service life (40 – 70 years), which is a costly and impractical undertaking. 
Such issues are common in most of the high lifetime components of power 
utilities. 
3.2.3 Complete and Right Censored Lifetime Data 
It is a refinement of the previous model by including in the analysis the 
components that were found to be under good condition. The remaining lifetime 
of components that are fit for service at the time of inspection is unknown; and it 








Figure 3.2: Inclusion of right censored lifetimes 
Figure 3.2 shows the conceptual representation of a typical inspection data 
under this model. The sample can be divided into two groups of complete and 
right censored lifetime data. Consideration of right censored data is important for 
a realistic estimation, since they contain valuable information about an improved 
prospect of future survival. Therefore, an omission of such data from statistical 
analysis could lead to an underestimation of life expectancy, as shown in Section 
3.4.1. 
3.2.4 Interval and Right Censored 
This is the most realistic model that mimics the periodic or non-periodic 
inspection data available from the power utility industry. In some cases the 
failures are not self announcing and can only be revealed from inspection. Such 
situations result in interval censored observations where only information 
between inspections is recorded. The statistical analysis of interval censored data 













Figure 3.3: A mixed cohort data with interval censored lifetimes (c = censoring 
interval) 
The available data on wood poles provide a single snap shot of pole 
population taken at the time of inspection in year 2002, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
The data consist of two groups: (1) right censored lifetimes, and (2) a small 
fraction of substandard poles, and their exact time of reaching the end of life is 
not known. The situation is analogous to cross-sectional surveys used in health 
impact assessment (Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1999, Lawless, 2003). 
The substandard pole data is treated as interval censored lifetimes, rather than 
considering them as complete lifetimes. The reason for assuming interval 
censoring is that the wood degradation is a fairly slow and intermittent process. 
The fungal decay continues only under favourable environment (humidity and 
temperature), otherwise it remains dormant. Also, reaching the substandard state 
does not result in an immediate pole failure. The reason is that poles are 
conservatively designed and wood is subject to low stresses under normal service 
conditions. The pole failure is typically caused by an extreme weather event. 
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Therefore, substandard poles may remain in-service for many years, until detected 
by an inspection. Because of this, the time of detection cannot be construed as the 
actual end of service life.  
3.2.5 Current Status Data 
This is a special case of interval censored model where the censoring interval is 
completely unknown. The censoring interval c in Figure 3.3 is the age of the 
component, such type of observation is also referred to as left censored data. 
Current status observations are common from cross sectional survey of 
population. The component has either failed at some point of time from the start 
of its service or either survived at the time of inspection. Such observations 
introduce greater uncertainty in estimating the lifetime of the components. The 
statistical estimation of current status data is complicated and can be estimated by 
likelihood methods discussed in Section 3.3.3.4. 
3.3 Lifetime Data Analysis 
In order to improve or make any decisions on a system performance, the decision 
maker needs to have an idea on how the system behaves in its lifetime. 
Information on the system can be known from data on system monitoring or on 
system test data or on expert opinion. These lifetime data can be modelled with 
suitable mathematical expressions. This information is helpful in quantifying the 
system lifetime, which in turn helps in developing models which can improve the 
system performance. 
The definition of lifetime includes a time scale and time origin, as well as 
specification of event that determines the lifetime. The commonly used models 
for lifetime estimation can be classified as fully parametric, non-parametric and 
semi parametric (Lawless, 2003, Cox and Oakes, 1984, Nelson, 1982). This 
section discusses the estimation techniques to model the lifetime data using 
illustrations from various inspection methods.  
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3.3.1 Terminology 
3.3.1.1 Probability Distribution Function 
Considering a component whose time to failure ‘T’ is a continuous random 
variable. It means that the component can fail at any random time following a 
probability density function f(t). The distribution function is the probability that 
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3.3.1.2 Survival Function 
The survival function also called the reliability function is the probability of 
survival at time t or the probability of time to failure T is greater than t, which is 
given by 
)(1)Pr()( tFtTtS −=>=  (3.2) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Survival and Distribution Curves 
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As shown in Figure 3.4, the point at which both curves meet is the median 
value time t50. The Mean time to failure (MTTF) for the component (mean 
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By applying integration by parts, it can show that the MTTF can be expressed 
as the area under the survival curve. The expression for MTTF in terms of 
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Figure 3.5 shows survival plots for two components with equal MTTF and 
different variance. Component 2 has lower variability than component 1 in time to 
failure distribution.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Survival curves for two components 
3.3.1.3 Hazard Function 
Hazard rate can be defined as the conditional failure probability of the component 
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The hazard rate is also called instantaneous failure rate (or age specific 





tfth =   (3.6) 
The cumulative hazard is integrated summation of hazard probabilities as 
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The expressions h(t), f(t), S(t), H(t) can be derived by knowing any one of the 
expressions.   
For example, conducting a test on the failure of N similar components and 
keeping track of failures with time. The survival distribution and hazard estimates 
can be given as 
N
m
tF ii =)(ˆ   (3.8) 
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N → Total number of components 
mi → Number of components failed until time ti 
d(ti) → Number of components failed exactly at time ti 
N(ti) → Number of components survived at time ti 
 




Table 3.1 Relationship among probability functions 
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There exists a variety of models which can be used in lifetime distributions, 
for example, exponential, Gaussian, Extreme value, Gamma etc (Lawless, 2003, 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002). The widely used model in engineering 
application is Weibull which is discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2 Parametric Distributions 
3.3.2.1 Weibull Distribution 
The Weibull distribution is the most popular choice in the survival analysis with 





























β tth  (3.11) 
where scale and shape parameters are denoted by α >0 and β>0, respectively. The 
hazard decreases for β<1 and increases for β>1 whereas for β=1 Weibull 
distribution is an exponential with constant hazard rate. The hazard rate curves for 




Figure 3.6 Hazard Plots with varying shape parameters 
The Figure 3.6 shows that a wide variety of hazard rate behaviour can be 
modeled with Weibull distribution. Because of such potential and simplicity of 
probability functions Weibull model are popular in engineering applications. 
Discrete models can also be found in literature (Nakagawa and Osaki, 1975, Stein 
and Dattero, 1984) which is helpful in modeling particular discrete data types. In 
this thesis the data is modeled by a continuous Weibull distribution model. 
3.3.2.2 Gompertz Distribution 
The Gompertz distribution is a popular choice in the demography and its survival 
and hazard rate functions are given as (Keyfitz, 1985) 
( )CCBtS tT log/)1(exp)( −−=  and tBCth =)(  (3.12) 
where B and C are the distribution parameters.  
3.3.2.3 Log-Logistic Distribution 
The log-logistic distribution is also used in the survival analysis literature 
(Lawless, 2003) 
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3.3.3 Non-Parametric Lifetime Distribution 
3.3.3.1 Complete Data 
In the first model as discussed in Section 3.2.2, a sample of complete lifetime data 
is considered for the analysis. The sample consists of di entries of age ti, i = 1, N, 










)(  (3.15) 
where fT(t) is the probability density of the lifetime distribution. In other words, 
the sample likelihood is proportional to the probability that the data comes from 
the model fT(t). Assuming an analytical distribution function (e.g. Weibull 
distribution), its parameters can be estimation by maximizing Eq.(3.15). 
An empirical (sample based) survival curve, ST(t), can be analytically derived 
considering that lifetimes are recorded as a discrete variable taking values t1 < 
t2< …< tN. The probability density at age ti can be estimated as 
)()()( 1+−= iTiTi tStStf  and it is related to the hazard rate as )()()( iii tSthtf = . 
Combining these relations leads to a recursive equation of survival curve.  
{ })(1)()()()()()()( 11 iiiiiiii thtStStStStSthtf −=⇔−== ++  (3.16) 










kiT thtS  (3.17) 
Using Eqs.(3.16) and (3.17), the likelihood function can be written in terms 
of the hazard rate, and maximizing the log likelihood with respect to the hazard 
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)(  (3.19) 
3.3.3.2 Complete and Right Censored Lifetime Data 
This model also considers the right censored lifetimes observed in the inspection 
data. The censoring time corresponds to the age at the time of inspection. 
Considering in an age group ti, the sample consists of di complete lifetimes and (ni 
- di) right censored lifetimes, the likelihood function is given as 











)()(  (3.20) 
Again using Eqs.(3.16) and (3.17), the likelihood function is written in terms 
of the hazard rate, and maximizing the log likelihood leads to a non-parametric 
estimate of the hazard rate at age ti similar to that given by Eq.(3.18). However, in 







ki ntm )(  (3.21) 
Kaplan and Meier (1958) first derived this non-parametric (or product limit) 
estimator of the survival function.  
3.3.3.3 Interval and Right Censored Lifetime Data 
In this model, the complete lifetimes are replaced with the interval censored 
values. The likelihood function for a sample with di interval censored and (ni - di) 
right censored lifetimes in the age group ti, is written as 











where c denotes the censoring interval and FT(t) is the cumulative lifetime (T) 
distribution. Note that the conditional distribution, used to account for the 















−=−>−=−>  (3.23) 
Now the conditional survival probability in Eq.(3.23) can be written in a discrete 








































tSctTtS  (3.24) 
Although the likelihood function can be written in terms of hazard rates using 
Eq.(3.24), a simple analytical expression for the hazard rate estimator cannot be 
derived. In such cases it is convenient to use parametric distribution models to 
estimate survival probabilities. 
3.3.3.4 Current Status Data 
Estimation of non parametric estimates from current status observations as 
discussed in Section 3.2.5 is not a straight forward task. However, the survival 
function can be estimated by Maximum likelihood method as described below 
(Turnbull, 1976, Meeker and Escobar, 1998). Considering the case of a cross 
sectional study conducted on a component population in a particular year 
resulting in a snap shot of condition data on the population. 
Consider that the component population consists of age groups 10321 ,...,,, tttt  
at the time of inspection as shown in Figure 3.7. For each age group the number 
of components inspected ( in ) and the number of components in failed state ( id ) 
is known. Consider the interval failure probabilities ip  in the population as 
shown in Figure 3.7 for the observed data. 
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Figure 3.7: Parameters used in non-parametric MLE of current status data 
The probability pi shown in Figure 3.7 is the probability of component failure 
within the age interval. The cumulative probability of failure in each age group 








)(   (3.25) 
Similarly the survival probability can be calculated as )(1)( iTiT tFtS −= . The 
parameters pi in Figure 3.7 can be estimated by method of maximum likelihood. 
The likelihood function for the observed data on N age groups can be written as 











)(1)()(  (3.26) 
where )( iT tF  is written in terms of probabilities pi as in Eq.(3.25). The logarithm 
of the likelihood function in Eq.(3.26) can be maximized to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimates ip̂ . The confidence limits on the estimates can be estimated 
from the fisher information matrix of the likelihood function Eq.(3.26). 
3.3.4 Estimation of Parametric Lifetime Distribution 
3.3.4.1 Maximum Likelihood Method 
The likelihood functions for various cases of complete and incomplete data sets 
are discussed in the previous section. In this section the application of such 
likelihood models is discussed for parametric estimation of the assumed 
distribution model. In this section the Weibull model is considered to illustrate the 
application of this method. Considering the case of complete data with multiple 











)(  (3.27) 
Where di is the number of complete observations at time ti, n is the number of 
instances of lifetimes observed. Considering lifetime distribution follows Weibull 










































βθ  (3.28) 
where θ  is the vector of the distribution parameters of the Weibull model. The 
parameters are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function. To simplify the 
numerical computation the natural logarithm of the likelihood is maximized to 

















βφβ  (3.29) 
where φ  is substituted for βα . Standard optimization algorithm can be used to 
estimate the parameters by maximizing Eq.(3.29). Alternatively, the parameters 
are found by solving the first partial derivatives of the likelihood function 
Eq.(3.29) with respect to the parameter. The first partial derivatives of the log-









































































































  (3.31) 
Solving Eqs.(3.31), the estimates for β̂ and α̂ are obtained. Likewise the 
parameters of the selected distribution are estimated by maximizing the log-
likelihood function corresponding to the observed data.  
For the case of complete and right censored, the likelihood function Eq.(3.20) 

































































β  (3.32) 
The likelihood function applicable to Interval censored along with right 

































































The likelihood function for the case of current status data is similar to that 
given in Eq. (3.33) where censoring interval 0=c . 
For computational purpose, the logarithm of the likelihood (Eqs. 3.28, 3.32, 
3.33) is maximized with respect to the distribution parameters (α and β) using a 
standard MATLABTM optimization code (fminsearch and fminunc).  
The Fisher information matrix is the expectation of the negative of the second 
derivative of the log likelihood with respect to the parameters. Fisher information 
is used to obtain asymptotic variance of the maximum likelihood estimator of the 
distribution parameters (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 2002). The asymptotic 
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covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimators is the inverse of the 
























































  (3.34) 
Using the asymptotic variance of the estimated parameters the approximate 
confidence intervals can be obtained for the parameters estimated. A confidence 
interval gives an estimated range of values which is likely to include the unknown 
population parameter. Confidence interval is associated with confidence level 
which gives the probability that the true value of the parameter lies within the 

































































UL   (3.36) 
The bounds are derived based on lognormal approximation with confidence 
level a, where )2/1(1 ak −Φ= − . For 95% confidence bounds (a=5%) on 
parameter estimates, the value of k is 1.96. The variance of a function of 
distribution parameters is estimated by delta method. The mean lifetime of 









αμ 11T   (3.37) 
By delta method, the variance of mean lifetime is calculated as 
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Different types of parametric models can be applicable using likelihood 
functions given in Section 3.3.3. One way to check for the best fit is by comparing 
the parametric probability function plots with the non-parametric estimates. 
Besides the graphical methods statistical tests are used to check the best fit model.  
3.3.4.2 Test of Goodness of Fit  
Models vary in complexity and assumptions, and it is necessary to check the 
adequacy of the models. Although the probability plots are one of the tools to 
check the models, they are not just sufficient to check some of the assumptions. 
Hypothesis tests are most commonly used by statisticians to check the adequacy 
of the models. The classical procedures (Lawless, 2003) to compare the 
parametric models with non-parametric counterparts are Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic and Cramer-von Mises Statistic. Such test statistics provide evidence for 
or against the hypothesized model. Tests of fit for specific distributions (Lawless, 
2003) like Weibull or Extreme are also available for complete and right censored 
data.  
Likelihood Ratio Statistic (LRS) is commonly used to compare different 
models (Lawless, 2003, Nelson, 1982). LRS for testing null hypothesis (H0) Vs 
alternative hypothesis (H1) can be given by 
)ˆ(log2)ˆ(log2 01 θθ LL −=Λ   (3.39) 
Let the number of independent parameters in models H1 and H0 are m and n 
respectively. Then under H0 and for large sample size Λ  is approximately chi-
squared distribution ( 2 nm−χ ).  
3.3.4.2.1 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
In the absence of the true model it is difficult to compare models from tests 
like LRS or other tests discussed above. On the other hand Akaike (1985) has 
developed an information criterion (AIC) without specific reference to the true 
model. Hence AIC can be useful in comparing different models. AIC is based on 
entropy maximization principle (Akaike, 1985) which is the maximization of the 
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expected entropy of a true distribution with respect to the fitted predictive 
distribution. 
It is known that the maximum likelihood method leads to biased estimates of 
the true parameters in case of finite sample data (Baker, 1990). Akaike derived an 
unbiased estimator based on an information-theoretic interpretation of the 
likelihood function. He proposed the following measure to test the goodness of fit 
of an assumed model (Akaike, 1985): 
KLAIC MAX 2]log[2 +−=  (3.40) 
where K is the number of distribution parameters and LMAX is maximum value of 
the likelihood function under an assumed model. Among all candidate 
distributions, the distribution that minimizes the AIC measure is considered as the 
best fit distribution. The mathematical proofs are further discussed by Awad 
(1996) and Cavanaugh (1997). 
Since the AIC is on a relative scale that can range from a large negative to a 
large positive limit, the AIC difference is a suitable basis to evaluate the goodness 
of fit, which is calculated as 
AICAICAIC ii min)( −=Δ  (i = 1 - 3) (3.41) 
where “min AIC” is the minimum value of the AIC measure among all the 
distributions considered. For the best fit distribution, Δ(AIC) = 0. 
3.3.5 Frailty Models 
During lifetime data analysis among a collection of individuals it is assumed that 
the lifetimes are independent. But there could be some unobserved risk factors 
that are common between the individuals and constant over time. The frailty is the 
term that describes the common risks acting as a factor on the hazard function. 
Frailty model assume that all lifetime observations are independent given the 
values of the frailty. This offers an advantage in interpretation of frailty as a 
probability model, that is the conditional independence implies that dependence is 
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created by the common factors or the variation within individuals (Hougaard, 
2000).   
The unobserved risk within individuals is described by a random variable Y. 
The hazard conditional on Y has the form. 
)()|( 0 tYhYth =  (3.42) 

















0 )()( . The marginal survival function can be evaluated by 
integrating out the unobserved distribution. 





where ()L  is the Laplace transform of the random variable Y. 
Frailty models can be developed by choosing different parametric 
distributions like Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz discussed in Section 3.3.2 and 
distributions like Gamma and Inverse Gaussian for the frailty. In this section 
Gamma frailty models are considered which are popular in survival analysis. 
3.3.5.1 Gamma Frailty Model 
When the frailty follows gamma distribution with unit mean and finite unknown 
variance δ gamma frailty models are derived. The marginal survival distribution 
for gamma frailty models using marginal Gamma distribution is derived as 
[ ] δδ /1)(1)( −+= tGtS  (3.45) 
If the conditional distributions are taken as Weibull the marginal survival 
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When the conditional distribution is taken as Gompertz the marginal survival 


















In general gamma frailty models are parametric distribution models with an 
additional parameter used in modelling the lifetime distribution of components. 
The parameters of the gamma frailty distributions are estimated by likelihood 
methods discussed in Section 3.3.4. 
3.3.6 Entropy and Life Expectancy 
The concept of entropy discussed in this section comes from the field of 
demography. In general policy decisions on life saving efforts depend on the age 
specific mortality and life expectancy. In an effort to reduce the mortality to 
increase the life expectancy of the population which decade of ages would be the 
selected. In doing so, there is a need for better understanding of the linkage 
between the age specific mortality and life expectancy. Similar analogy can be 
derived for maintenance of engineering components. In a population of 
components which are distributed among various ages which age group need to be 
addressed for maintenance actions.  












),0(   (3.48) 
where w is the highest survival age, the entropy can be interpreted as a measure of 
heterogeneity of population with respect to mortality at different ages. If everyone 
dies at same age then K=0; if the hazard rate is same at all ages (Constant) then 
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K=1. K gives the percentage change in life expectancy produced by reducing the 
hazard rate at all ages by one percent. If K=0.1 then the change in life expectancy 
by reducing the mortality at all ages by one percent is 0.1%.  










































  (3.49) 
where h(), f() are the hazard rate function and probability density function. e(x) is 
the remaining life expectancy at age x and e(0) is the life expectancy at birth (zero 
age). Vaupel (1986) states that this formula facilitates understanding of why K 
measures the percentage increase in life expectancy generated by a decrease in 
mortality rates of one percent. The numerator in Eq.(3.49) can be integrated 
within an age interval to quantify the increase in life expectancy by reducing the 
mortality in those ages by one percent. The case on component life expectancy is 
considered for illustrating the application of the entropy concept. 
3.3.6.1 Illustrative case 
The lifetime distribution of a component is considered with life expectancy of 67 
years. Weibull distribution with shape parameter as 4.48 and scale parameter of 
73.67 is considered for illustration. The entropy as calculated from Eq.(3.49) is 
0.22 taking the highest age w of the component as 100 years. This shows that 
when the mortality is reduced by 1% among all component ages the life 
expectancy is increased by 0.22%. The increase in life expectancy by reducing the 
mortality in each component age by one percent can be shown in Figure 3.8. The 
Figure 3.8 shows that the change in mortality among ages near life expectancy 
can increase the life expectancy reasonably higher than other age groups.  
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LE = 67 Years
 
Figure 3.8: Change in life expectancy with change in mortality rate 
The mortality changes in each component age can be viewed as age specific 
refurbishment rate. Refurbishing a fraction of components of a particular age 
group in a way decreases the mortality and increases the life expectancy of the 
population. Hence from entropy concept the change in life expectancy of the 
assets can be estimated from age specific refurbishment policies.  
Table 3.2: Entropy among different component age groups 
Component Age Entropy 
≥40 Years 0.19% 
≥50 Years 0.15% 
≥60 Years 0.11% 
 
When calculating entropy for components with age ≥40 years an increase of 
0.19% of life expectancy is estimated when reducing the mortality rate of 
components ≥40 years by one percent. Depending on population demographics of 
older age components, a cost benefit assessment can be made on age based 
refurbishment. From Table 3.2 it is evident that replacing components older than 
60 years can result in around 11% increase in population life expectancy. The 
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estimate on benefit of increasing the life expectancy through age based 
refurbishment is demonstrated using the concept of entropy.  
3.3.6.1.1 Remarks 
The entropy of the survival function is a property of a lifetime distribution which 
shows the linkage between age specific mortality and life expectancy. This 
concept is used in demography where policy decisions are based on individual age 
specific mortality and life expectancy. A similar application is thought of in 
component refurbishment policy in a population of distributed component ages. 
The concept of entropy can be used in identifying which age groups to be 
refurbished with considerable increase in population life expectancy. 
3.4 Applications in Power Industry 
3.4.1 Estimation of Life Expectancy of Wood Poles 
Condition assessment inspections are undertaken by power utilities to identify 
decayed poles and decide about their subsequent replacement depending on the 
degree of wood deterioration. A key input of probabilistic methodology is the 
lifetime distribution function of wood pole, though its estimation is often 
hampered by lack of data. This section presents comprehensive statistical analysis 
to provide estimates of life expectancy and the survival curve of typical 
distribution wood pole in-service in the Canadian climate (Datla and Pandey, 
2006). 
3.4.1.1 Summary of Data 
Inspection data collected by the industry consist of classification of each 
inspected pole on a binary scale, i.e., whether or not the pole has reached its end 
of life based on its current condition at the time of inspection. 
This study has reviewed a random sample of approximately 100,000 
distribution wood poles (selected from a population of 2 million distribution poles 
in Ontario) that were assessed by inspectors of the power utilities in year 2002. 
The inspection program revealed that approximately 5.46% poles of different ages 
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were in substandard condition. The pole age was determined on the basis of the 
installation date stamped on each pole.  
The age distribution of wood poles in the sample is shown in Figure 3.9. The 
average age of in-service poles is estimated as 29 years with a standard deviation 






































Figure 3.10: Fraction of substandard poles observed in different age groups  
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The fraction of substandard poles as a percentage of pole population in each 
age group in the sample is plotted in Figure 3.10.  
The data presented in Figure 3.10 reveals the cumulative number of 
substandard poles in each age group. Substandard poles did not reach end of life 
in the year of inspection, rather it represents the number of substandard poles that 
were accumulated over a period of time. The reasons are that (1) there are no 
records a prior inspection of this sample, (2) the time of pole reaching the 
substandard state is not manifested by a physical pole failure and interruption in 
power supply, and (3) the substandard state is determined through inspection only. 
Because of these reasons, the estimation of lifetime distribution from inspection 
data is not a straightforward task.  
Based on the information presented in Figure 3.9 and 3.10, estimation of the 
pole lifetime probability distribution is a key problem that is discussed in this 
section. 
3.4.1.2 Numerical Results 
Statistical analyses of industry’s inspection data were conducted under the three 
models discussed in Section 3.2. In each case, the three parametric distributions 
were fitted to estimate the pole life expectancy and the survival curve. The effects 
of model assumptions and model uncertainty are discussed in this section.  
Model 1: Complete Lifetime Sample 
This model considers only substandard poles (5.46% of sample) assuming that 
they all reached the end of life in the year of inspection. The non-parametric 
survival curve is derived from Eqs.(3.18) and (3.19). Using the maximum 
likelihood method, the parameters of the Weibull, Log-Logistic and the Gompertz 
distributions were estimated. The numerical results presented in Table 3.3 show 
that the life expectancy (LE) estimates obtained from the three distributions are in 
close agreement. The Weibull distribution is the best fit distribution according to 
the AIC criterion, which estimates the LE of wood poles as 40 years. 
 
 50

























Model 2: Complete and Right Censored Lifetime Sample 
This analysis extends Model 1 to incorporate the “right-censored” pole life times. 
The numerical results are presented in Table 3.4. The LE estimates vary from 62 – 
79 years depending on the distribution type. The Weibull distribution is again the 
best fit distribution that leads to pole LE of 69 years. The Gompertz distribution is 
the most pessimistic with LE of 62 years.  
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of wood pole survival curves (Model 1 vs. Model 2) 
The survival curves obtained from Models 1 and 2 are compared in Figure 
3.11, which plots the non-parametric estimates along with the best-fit Weibull 
distribution. In Model 1, an omission of right censored data results in a severe 
under estimation of the survival curve. The life expectancy (69 years) obtained 
from Model 2 is almost 75% higher than that obtained from the Model 1 (LE = 40 
years). Van Noortwijk and Klatter (2004) reported a similar effect of right 
censored data in the analysis of bridge lifetime data. 
Frailty models discussed in Section 3.3.5 are considered for the wood pole 
lifetime distribution analysis. The estimated parameters from Gompertz gamma 
frailty model are 8164.0,1195.1,0001.0 === δCB . This frailty model is a better 
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Figure 3.12: Gompertz gamma frailty survival curve 
The life expectancy from the Gompertz gamma frailty model is obtained as 
65 years. The maximum likelihood estimate of Weibull gamma frailty is obtained 
with 0=δ  which is the Weibull distribution. The result suggests that Weibull 
model is the most suitable model for wood pole lifetime. 
Model 3: Interval and Right Censored Data 
In this model, an assumption of complete lifetime is relaxed by incorporating 
interval censoring. The censoring interval is varied from 1 – 10 years to evaluate 
its impact on the life expectancy estimates and results are presented in Table 3.4. 
From industry’s experience, the average censoring interval is about 3 - 4 years. 
Results for 10 year censoring interval are presented to study the impact of an 
extreme censoring interval. 
The analysis of the goodness of fit in terms of the AIC difference criterion is 
presented in Table 3.5, which suggests the Weibull as the best fit distribution in 
most cases. In comparison to Model 2, an increase in censoring interval increases 
the life expectancy modestly. For a 3 year interval, the Weibull LE is estimated as 















1 4.48 73.67 67.21 16.75 25
2 4.18 76.19 69.23 18.41 27
3 4.05 77.47 70.26 19.25 27
4 3.92 78.76 71.31 20.11 28
5 3.81 80.08 72.38 20.98 29
10 3.33 87.03 78.10 25.64 33
Gompertz B C
1 0.0001 1.1109 61.25 14.35 23
2 0.0001 1.1073 61.71 14.67 24
3 0.0001 1.1039 62.17 14.99 24
4 0.0001 1.1008 62.64 15.30 24
5 0.0001 1.0979 63.10 15.62 25
10 0.0002 1.0853 65.48 17.19 26
Log-Logistic β α
1 4.49 72.31 78.55 35.34 45
2 4.35 73.42 80.23 37.66 47
3 4.21 74.55 81.95 40.09 49
4 4.08 75.70 83.74 42.64 51
5 3.96 76.88 85.58 45.33 53









1 0 450 90
2 0 526 66
3 0 592 46
4 0 648 30
5 0 700 18


















































Figure 3.14: Comparison of different survival curves for censoring interval of 3 
years (Model 3) 
Figure 3.13 shows that the effect of 3 – 5 year censoring interval on the 
Weibull survival curve is quite modest. The effect of distribution type (i.e., model 
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uncertainty) on survival curve is illustrated in Figure 3.14 (c= 3 year). The tail of 
the survival curve is quite sensitive to the distribution type. The log-logistic 
distribution leads to an upper bound life expectancy of 82 years, whereas the 
Gompertz model provides a lower bound of 62 years. The reason is that the 
hazard rate in the Gompertz model increases with age much more rapidly than in 
the other two models, which leads to a low value of life expectancy. Since the 
survival curve is a key input to the life-cycle cost analysis, it is important to 
evaluate the sensitivity of model uncertainty to the cost optimization problem. 
This issue is discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
3.4.1.3 Remarks: Model Comparison 
Figure 3.15 illustrates the effect of the three modeling assumptions regarding the 
inspections data on estimates of the Weibull survival curve. The analysis in 
Model 1 is simplistic as it ignores a vast amount of information about the survival 
of a large fraction of the sample. Model 1 is therefore the most pessimistic model, 
and it provides an unrealistic lower bound estimate of pole life expectancy (LE 























Figure 3.15: Comparison of the Weibull survival curves obtained from the three 
inspection models  
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Model 2 improves significantly the estimates of survival probabilities by 
consideration of the right censored data, and it leads to LE = 69 year. The survival 
curve of Model 3 (c=3) is in a close agreement with Model 2, and estimated LE = 
70 years. The analysis illustrates that the censoring interval of 3 - 5 years has 
limited sensitivity to the life expectancy estimates. The reason for this 
insensitivity is that the interval censored data is a very small fraction (5.46%) of 
the sample. The effect of censoring interval on LE increases with increase in the 
proportion of data in the sample. 
3.4.2 Lifetime Distribution of Oil Circuit Breakers 
3.4.2.1 Introduction 
Oil circuit breakers (OCB) are used to switch circuits and equipment in and out of 
a system in a substation as shown in Figure 3.16. They are oil filled to provide 
cooling and to prevent arcing when the switch is activated. The oil circuit breaker 
has number of sub-components like contacts, pushings, lifting rods etc. and all 
these components has to perform well in order to the circuit breaker to work.  
 
Figure 3.16: Oil Circuit Breaker 
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As the oil breaker is in usage the components are subjected to operating load 
and environmental effects which trigger the deterioration process.  Hence the oil 
breakers have to be subjected to periodic maintenance to ensure its smooth 
functioning. The maintenance packages vary from visual inspection conducted 
every six months to the intrusive maintenance which is the most expensive and 
conducted every 7 years. 
3.4.2.2 Summary of Data 
The data discussed in this section is obtained from a power industry which has 
collected maintenance data on oil circuit breaker (OCB) from 1999 to 2004. The 
majority of the OCBs are 27.6 kV and 44kV which consist of 752 Oil breakers 
that have undergone selective intrusive (SI) maintenance. For each OCB under 
selective intrusive maintenance has 5-6 individual tasks to access the condition of 
the oil-breaker and each is given a condition rating of CR1(good)-CR4(bad). SI 
maintenance package consists of the tasks as shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Description of SI maintenance tasks 
SI Task Description 
T2 Check insulation condition. 
T3 Inspect contacts and interrupters. 
T4 Measure resistance/resistors. 
T5 Contact wipe measurement (analyzer rod). 
T6 Inspect internal components and tank 
 
Data on Task T1 is not provided and hence will not be discussed here. Each 
task aims at specific degradation mechanism for various components of OCB. The 
condition rating of an OCB in each task is ranked as shown in Table 3.8 




CR1 Condition like new 
CR2 
Condition as expected (no unusual degradation, functional 
as per design) 
CR3 Signs of degradation 
CR4 Poor condition  
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End of Life Criterion 
An OCB with condition rating CR4 in a given maintenance category is assumed 
to be at the end of life (incipient failure) with respect to that maintenance 
category. A rating of CR3 means that remaining life is approximately 3 years. A 
rating of CR1 or CR2 is considered as the OCB in a good functional state as per 
design. The average SI maintenance interval is 7 years. Each task is assumed as 
independent degradation mechanisms; hence the estimation of lifetime of each 
degradation/task is essential for estimating the overall breaker lifetime. The 
results on lifetime analysis on each task are discussed in next section.  
3.4.2.3 Statistical Lifetime Analysis 
SI inspection data under each task is grouped to conduct lifetime analysis. Most of 
the breakers does not have record on the time of previous inspection and is thus 
assumed the average inspection interval of 7 years. Weibull distribution model is 
assumed to model the aging or deterioration effects in each task. The failure rate 
is assumed to linearly increase with time (Rayleigh Model) based on the 
preliminary analysis conducted on maintenance data. When the failure rate is 
assumed as constant (Exponential Model) the model underestimates the 
probability of failure, whereas when the failure rate is assumed highly nonlinear 
the model may overestimate the probability of failure.  
The breakers were assumed to be in condition CR1 at the outset of the 
interval. The breaker with condition rating CR4 in a given maintenance category 
is considered as complete observation. The breaker with condition rating CR3 in a 
given maintenance category is considered as interval censored towards right of 
the observation since it is assumed that the remaining life is approximately 3 
years. The breaker with condition CR1 and CR2 are considered as right censored 
observations. The estimation of lifetime distribution is conducted using maximum 
likelihood method discussed in Section 3.3.4. The mean lifetimes for different 
task categories is shown in the Table 3.9  
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Table 3.9: Mean lifetime of a breaker under different SI Inspection Tasks 
Task T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Number of OCBs 
inspected 708 709 278 696 699 
Mean Lifetime, Years 
(Rayleigh) 39 13 21 15 19 
Mean Lifetime, Years 
(Exponential) 547 40 81 43 104 
 
The mean life time is the lowest (13 years) with respect to the conditions of 
contacts and interrupters (T3). The mean lifetime is the highest (39 years) with 
respect to the insulation condition. The condition of tank (T6) reaches to CR4 on 
average in 19 years of service life. The mean lifetimes obtained from exponential 
distribution are much higher which underestimates the probability of failure. 
The lifetime distributions are shown in Figure 3.17 and 3.18. The area under 
the distribution between 0 and 7 years shows the probability of a breaker reaching 
CR4. For example, the probability of reaching CR4 in the task T3 (contacts and 




























































Figure 3.18: Lifetime distribution with respect to the tasks T2, T5 and T6 
3.4.2.4 Maintenance Interval Optimization 
The first step in optimizing a maintenance program is to increase the interval of SI 
maintenance from 7 years to say 8 or 10 years. An increase in SI interval will also 
increase the probability of the breaker reaching in CR4 condition. This will 
increase the probability of functional failure of a breaker. The contacts and the 
interrupters appear to be the most stressed parts of the breaker, since they have the 
lowest mean service life. If the SI interval is increased from 7 to 8 years, a 
maximum 5% increase in probability is estimated for the task T3 (contacts and 
interrupters). In other cases, the increase in probability is less than 5%. 
The probability of a breaker reaching in CR4 condition for different 
inspection intervals is presented in the Table 3.10. The lifetime distributions given 






Table 3.10: Probability of an OCB reaching in CR4 condition under different SI 
task 









8 years 10 years 
T2 39 2% 3% 5% 
T3 13 20% 25% 37% 
T4 21 8% 11% 16% 
T5 15 15% 19% 28% 
T6 19 10% 13% 19% 
 
3.4.2.5 Remarks 
The maintenance data collected on OCB gives very little information on 
component lifetimes. This creates difficulty in estimating the lifetime distribution 
of OCB. The time since previous inspection is taken as 7 years and the condition 
in each task define the lifetime of OCB. Weibull distribution with shape 
parameter 2 is assumed to model the lifetime in each task from aging effects. 
Lifetime distributions in each task are estimated from maximum likelihood 
method.  
The probabilistic analysis of breaker inspection data enables the development 
of risk-based models to optimize the maintenance program and minimize the 
associated life-cycle costs. The service lifetime ends when a breaker enters in 
CR4 (poor condition), since it triggers a corrective maintenance of the breaker. It 
does not reflect the true probability of functional failure of the breaker. For the 
sake of a proper risk assessment, a correlation between the CR4 rating and 
breaker probability of failure must be investigated. The past records of breaker 
failure should be examined to establish this correlation. There is a potential to 
increase the inspection interval from 7 to 8 or 10 years for some of the SI tasks 
that can result in cost savings. 
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3.4.3 Estimation of Lifetime Distribution of Electric Insulators 
3.4.3.1 Summary of Data 
Electric insulators are an important component on power transmission lines for 
electric utilities. Insulators experience degradation with usage and eventually fail. 
Maintenance of such insulators is crucial in maintaining the network reliability of 
power infrastructure. The lifetime of the insulators is required for maintenance 
decisions. Probabilistic lifetime distribution for insulators can be estimated from 
field failure data. The insulators are designed with high lifetime and so the 
failures observed are very few.  
A mockup inspection data on insulators obtained from the power utility for a 
specific population is shown in Table 3.11. The data shown in Table 3.11 is not 
considered in the analysis but reflects the actual data obtained from industry. The 
data obtained actually gives information on current status of insulators at the time 
of inspection. This is similar to the case of wood pole inspection but in this case 
there is insufficient data on aging population. 







21 0 25 
24 0 100 
25 2 500 
26 5 1000 
27 5 1000 
28 30 6000 
29 12 2000 
30 10 1500 
31 6 1000 
32 7 500 
 
The lifetime or failure of the insulator is defined as the time to enter defective 
state. The precise lifetime of the defective insulators is unknown, which happened 
sometime between installation and inspection time. The age of the insulators at 
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the time of inspection are derived from their installation dates. Such type of data 
is called left censored observations. This section discusses the problem of 
estimating the insulator lifetime distribution from current status data. 
3.4.3.2 Statistical Data Analysis 
The data from actual inspection of insulators similar to that shown in Table 3.11 
is considered for the analysis. The non-parametric estimates are first calculated by 
Maximum Likelihood method as discussed in Section 3.3.3.4. The plot on the 
























Figure 3.19: Non parametric MLE estimates of survival probabilities 
The survival estimates of the insulators from Figure 3.19 are high indicating that 
the insulators have very high lifetime. The survival probability estimate for 
insulator age 32 years is 98.7% which is the oldest insulator in service. The 
parameters of Weibull distribution are estimated as discussed in Section 3.3.4.1. 
The maximum likelihood estimate in this case converged to a very high life 
expectancy of 521 years and C.O.V of 61%. Although there exists a local 
convergent solution with shape parameter as 5.27 and scale as 74.56 with life 
expectancy of 69 years and C.O.V of 22%. The reason for this discrepancy can be 
seen in Figure 3.20 where the MLE tries to fit observations collected in the early 
































Figure 3.20: Weibull Survival Fit 
It is therefore difficult to estimate a realistic parametric model with few 
observations in its initial lifetime. Parametric models are usually used to predict 
the remaining lifetime for maintenance decisions. In case of insulators as shown 
in Figure 3.20, many parametric models would be plausible and differ very much 
in the tail leading to different remaining life expectancy. Assuming Raleigh 
distribution resulted in a life expectancy of 320 years with C.O.V of 52.2% and 
parameters shape and scale are 2 and 365.23 respectively.  
3.4.3.3 Remarks 
The case of current status data obtained from field inspections from power utility 
is discussed in this section. Such data introduce a greater uncertainty in lifetimes 
of the components which can be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. The 
lifetime of the insulators are estimated to be very high from field inspection study. 
The few observations on insulator lifetimes create difficulty in estimating a 
reasonable parametric model and in predicting the remaining lifetime.  
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3.4.4 Analysis of Feeder Pipe Cracking 
3.4.4.1 Summary of Data 
The case study is from the inspection of 380 feeder pipes from a nuclear reactor. 
Feeder pipes are one of the critical components of primary heat transport system 
in nuclear reactor. The data consists of the time to crack detection of eight feeder 
pipes and time of last inspection for three of them. Out of the 8 feeder pipe cracks 
three are through wall cracks resulting in pipe leakage. Crack depth measurements 
on the 8 observations are used to estimate the growth rate (crack depth/detection 
time). Since the feeder pipes are not continuously monitored the growth of crack 
is assumed to follow linear growth model. The rest 372 pipes are still in service 
and have not shown any cracks.  
Lifetime distribution model based on three leak observations and the rest 377 
right censored observations is analyzed. Method of maximum likelihood 
assuming Weibull distribution resulted in life expectancy of 43 years and variance 
of lifetime as 95. The uncertainty in estimating the life expectancy is high due to 
sparse data on feeder lifetimes as shown in Table 3.12.  
Table 3.12: Parameters of Weibull lifetime distribution 
Model Parameters Estimate Lower 95% CL 
Upper 
95% CL 
Shape (β) 5.06 1.65 15.54 
Scale (α) 47.06 15.82 139.98 
Weibull Mean Lifetime 
( Tμ ) 
43.24 15.58 120.04 
 
This lifetime model ignores the fact that five feeder pipes having partial 
cracks. The problem can also be analyzed by modeling the crack growth rate. The 
problem is to estimate the lifetime distribution of pipe failure and annual 
probability of leak prediction in future time interval is discussed in the next 
section. 
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3.4.4.2 Statistical lifetime Model 
One way to analyze the data is by estimating the uncertainty in crack growth rate 
by modelling the crack growth rate observations by Weibull distribution. The 
probability that a pipe with thickness h and with growth rate r fails at time t is 
given as )Pr( hrt ≥× , when growth rate follows a Weibull distribution with 













































  (3.51) 
This shows that the derived distribution of t follows Inverse Weibull with 















μ 11ht   (3.52) 
The observations on growth rate are analysed by method of maximum 
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Figure 3.21: Survival Probability Curve of Feeder Lifetime 
The parameters of the Weibull distribution for the growth rate model are 
calculated as (0.3844, 2.85). The probability of pipe failure follows inverse 
Weibull with parameters (18.21, 2.85) considering wall thickness of 7 mm. The 
survival probability plot along with 95% confidence limits is shown in Figure 
3.21. The life expectancy of the feeder pipe is actually a function of wall 
thickness as shown in Eq.(3.52). With wall thickness of 7 mm, the life expectancy 
can be calculated from Eq.(3.52) as 25 years. 
3.4.4.3 Probability of Failure Analysis 
After estimating the lifetime distribution of the feeder pipes, the conditional 
probability of failure in future can be predicted.  The probability that a feeder pipe 
following a lifetime distribution T fails in a particular year ‘t’ given that it had 




tStStAr −−=   (3.53) 
The above expression gives the annual probability of failure as a function of 
future year intervals. Considering lifetime of feeder pipe described by growth rate, 
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the annual probability of failure in future year intervals 21-40 years given that the 
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Figure 3.22 Probability of pipe failure in future operation 
Figure 3.22 shows the annual probability of failure in future year intervals 21-40 
along with 95% confidence bounds. The confidence limits show a higher 
uncertainty in estimating the annual risk due to very few observations. The annual 
probability of failure in future (conditioned on the information that the feeder pipe 
has survived at age 20 years) is relatively high (around 10%) in the initial period 
of operation but gradually decreases with time. 
3.4.4.4 Remarks 
The lifetime of feeder pipes is estimated from observed growth rates of feeder 
pipes. The distribution of pipe lifetime follows inverse Weibull assuming that the 
growth rate distribution follows Weibull. The uncertainty in rate of crack growth 
is assumed to follow a linear growth rate model. The annual probability of failure 
in the initial operation period is very high. It could be possible that the linear 
growth rate model estimates a higher feeder lifetime. The observations are also 
limited showing a greater uncertainty in estimating annual probability of failure. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
It is not always possible to observe complete lifetimes through periodic 
inspections. In most cases, the observed lifetimes are either right-censored or 
interval-censored. The chapter presents statistical methods to analyze various 
types of incomplete data encountered from inspection of components in the 
energy industry. The effect of incomplete lifetime data in estimating the lifetime 
distributions is illustrated. 
A comprehensive statistical analysis of realistic inspection data for estimating 
the lifetime distribution of wood pole distribution networks is discussed. The 
analysis concludes that the pole inspection data commonly collected by power 
utilities should be modeled as a combination of interval-censored and the right-
censored sample of lifetimes. The analysis suggests that the pole survival curve is 
well approximated with the Weibull probability distribution, and from the data 
considered, the pole life expectancy is estimated at 69 years. The fitted 
distribution and life expectancy estimate are data dependent, although the 
methodology presented is general. A simplistic data analysis that ignores the 
censoring of lifetime can result in a severe underestimation of life expectancy.  
In the case of oil circuit breakers, there is insufficient data to quantify the 
degradation. This is similar to the wood pole problem, in which the collecting of 
inspection data has lately started in the service of OCB and there is insufficient 
data to model the degradation by stochastic models. Lifetime models are therefore 
used in estimating the lifetime distribution, using condition data from selective 
intrusive inspections. The condition information on each task can be interpreted as 
censored and complete lifetimes. The lifetimes are assumed to follow Weibull 
distribution with linear failure rate (i.e shape parameter is fixed at 2) based on the 
preliminary assessment of maintenance data. The lifetime distribution in each task 
is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. The estimated lifetime 
distributions suggest that there is a potential to increase the inspection interval 
from 7 years to 8 or 10 years, to achieve cost savings. 
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In case of electric insulators, the data obtained from power utilities is a 
snapshot of the state of insulators from a single inspection. The exact lifetimes of 
insulators are unknown, so the data type is therefore considered as current status. 
From the available data, the survival probability estimates of insulators are 
calculated to be very high. It is therefore difficult to estimate a realistic parametric 
model since the remaining lifetime of the current population is uncertain.  
The feeder cracking problem is another case in which there are only three 
complete observations (leaks), and the rest as right censored. The life expectancy 
in such a case can be estimated as 43 years, but there is greater uncertainty in the 
estimate. The crack growth rate is of interest to engineers in feeder pipe life cycle 
management. The probability of failure due to through-wall leakage is of concern. 
The randomness in crack growth rate is used to derive the distribution of feeder 
lifetime. The lifetime distribution is derived as inverse Weibull, while the crack 
growth rate is assumed to follow Weibull distribution. The life expectancy is 
estimated to be 25 years, a value which keeps the current age of feeder pipe near 
life expectancy, leading to a higher annual probability of pipe failure after another 
five years.   
The major contribution of the lifetime distribution chapter is to present the 
methodology for estimating realistic lifetime distribution from incomplete lifetime 
data usually obtained from field inspection studies in energy infrastructure. The 
chapter also discusses the difficulty in interpreting and estimating the lifetime 
distribution from highly censored observations. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 LCM MODEL USING LIFETIME DISTRIBUTIONS 
4.1 Overview 
This Chapter discusses the application of probabilistic models in equipment life 
cycle management. Firstly the age based replacement policy popular in energy 
industry is applied for wood pole management. The sequential inspection based 
component replacement models for a distributed population are illustrated. The 
effect of imperfect preventive maintenance on maintenance decisions is modeled 
using the concept of virtual age. 
4.2 Age Based Replacement Policy 
The age-based replacement policy is the conceptually simplest and an effective 
policy to implement in a system with large population of relatively inexpensive 
components (Barlow and Proschan, 1965). In this policy, a component is replaced 
at the age t0 or at failure, whichever occurs first. The objective of the policy is to 
select the replacement age to that minimizes the life-cycle cost rate associated 
with the policy. 
Consider the cost of preventive replacement as CP, which includes the 
inspection, labour and equipment costs. An additional cost incurred due to failure 
is denoted as CF, which includes additional costs due to power interruption and 
corrective repair to be done under an emergency.  
According to the renewal theorem, the replacement age (to) should be 
selected to optimize the expected average cost rate, Z(t0), in a long run (Barlow 
and Proschan, 1965). The expected cost rate is defined as the ratio of the expected 






tCEtZ =  (4.1) 
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where C(to) is the life-cycle cost and TL is the cycle length, defined as the time 
between replacements. It is a random variable that is related to the life time 
distribution and replacement age with cumulative distribution given as 
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The expected cost is derived as E[C(to)] = )( oTFP tFCC + . Finally, the 
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The optimum replacement time is determined by minimizing Z(to) with 
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where h(to) is hazard rate at the replacement age. The optimum replacement age is 
the solution of Eq.(4.6) in terms of the cost ratio, CP/CF, and the survival function. 
4.2.1 Wood Pole Replacement Problem 
Figure 4.1 presents a generic plot of the optimal replacement age (topt) versus the 
cost ratio is obtained by numerically solving Eq.(4.6) and using the best-fit 





















Model 3(c = 3)
 
Figure 4.1: Optimal replacement age versus cost ratio 
The use of this curve can be illustrated by an example. Typically, the 
preventive replacement cost of a wood pole is CP = 1000 CAD$ and additional 
failure cost is CF = 5000 CAD$. The optimal replacement age can be directly read 
from the plot for the cost ratio CP/CF = 0.2. The optimal replacement age obtained 
from Model 2 and 3 is 40 years, whereas Model 1 as expected provides a 
pessimistic estimate of 22 year. It is clear that an incorrect modeling of inspection 
data in Model 1 would lead excessively conservative replacement policy with 























Figure 4.2: Optimal Age replacement policy for different distributions (Model 3, 
c=3) 
The sensitivity of the replacement age to distribution type is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 for Model 3. In the case of CP/CF = 0.2, the distribution type has a 
small influence on topt, which varies in a narrow range of 39 – 41 year. The reason 
for such observation is the survival curves of the distributions are not significantly 
different until age 50 years but differ significantly in the tail of survival curves.   
It is a remarkable that the optimization of replacement age (topt) is quite 
insensitive to the distribution over a practical and wide ranging values of the cost 
ratios, 0 < CP/CF < 0.6. The distribution type matters more when the preventive 
cost is a large proportion of the failure cost (CP/CF > 0.6), though in such cases 
the age-based replacement policy may not be suitable.  
4.2.1.1 Remarks 
The analysis presents a generic method to optimize the age of pole replacement as 
a function of the life-cycle cost. For a cost ratio of CP/CF = 0.2, the optimal 
replacement age is estimated as 40 years. An interesting conclusion is that the 
type of lifetime distribution (Weibull, Gompertz or Log-logistic) has a limited 
sensitivity to the optimum replacement age and the expected life-cycle cost. 
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4.3 Sequential Inspection Based Replacement Model 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section presents a risk based approach to manage components from a large 
distribution networks. Network components being large in number play a 
significant role in the overall Asset Management of the network system. 
Maintenance of such a large infrastructure is a major problem that the asset 
managers face in this competitive world. The population is so large that all 
components cannot be inspected in any one year due to a prohibitively high 
inspection cost and labour requirements. Therefore, there is need for the 
development of quantitative methods on decisions related to inspection and 
replacement strategies adopted by most network organizations.  
The development of a probabilistic model for sequential inspection based 
maintenance program is addressed in this section. The impact of replacement 
strategies on life-cycle performance (i.e., risk and cost) is quantified. This 
analysis can then be used to optimize the maintenance interval and replacement 
rate in order to meet a performance target defined in terms the cost, risk or both 
cost and risk.  
In summary, this section presents a complete probabilistic risk-based 
framework for life-cycle management of distribution networks. The approach has 
a significant potential in minimizing the maintenance cost and risk and improving 
asset management practices in general. The proposed model is generic, and is 
equally applicable to the asset management of large infrastructures.  
4.3.2 Estimation of Substandard Component Population 
A probabilistic method is presented to estimate the fraction of substandard 
components in the distribution network based on current component 
demographics and survival curve estimated from the inspection data.  
The model predicts the component “failure rate”, which is the annual rate of 
components reaching the end of life in a specified year. The proportion of 
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substandard components in the distribution network is also estimated, which 
directly relates to risk of failure or vulnerability associated with the integrity of 
components in the network. The proportion of substandard components is 
essential to the assessment of life-cycle cost and reliability analysis. The proposed 
model will be applied to optimize component replacement strategies in the next 
section. 
4.3.2.1 Model 
The age-specific failure associated with a component of age X years in a future 
interval of t to t+1 year is estimated from the component survival curve, S(t), as a 
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where the first term in the bracket is the probability of an age X component 
surviving up to age X+t, and the second term, h(X+t), is the hazard rate at age 
X+t. The conditional failure probability in effect can be derived from the 











tXftM TX  (4.9) 
where )(xfT  denotes the component life-time density function.  
A similar approach as shown in Eq. (4.7) is discussed by Li, et al., (2004) to 
predict the number of failures in a planning horizon. Since the population consists 
of components of different ages, as described by the age distribution, )(xf A  , the 
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The cumulative proportion of substandard components, referred to as 
vulnerability index (VI), in a time interval 0 (present) to t year is simply given by 
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4.3.2.2 Illustration of Conditional Failure Probability Estimation 
The estimation of conditional failure probability of a 20-year component in future 
is considered. Since the component has survived up to age 20, the original life-
time distribution (dotted curve) must be replaced with an updated conditional 
distribution as shown in Figure. 4.3 The bar at age 40-41 shows the conditional 
failure probability (4%) after 20 years, i.e., when the component age becomes 40 
years. In simple terms, 4% of components at the current age 20 are expected to 
reach their end of life in a future interval in the 40th to 41st year. 
 
Figure. 4.3.  Illustration of conditional failure probability estimation 
4.3.2.3 Results 
The estimates of cumulative number of substandard components as a percentage 
of the total component population are presented in Figure. 4.4 These results are 
obtained using the input data presented in Table 4.1  
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Table 4.1.  Statistical input data for illustrative results 







Distribution 30 15 Weibull 
Lifetime 
Distribution 40 10 Weibull 
 
Figure. 4.4 show the substandard components in the population that are 
obtained from statistics from Table 4.1. The plot highlights the impact of 
component demographics on the number of substandard components in absence 
of an inspection and replacement program. For example, Figure. 4.4 show the 
total (cumulative) number of substandard components after 20 years is estimated 
as 70% on the basis of a component life expectancy of 40 years.  
This analysis confirms the need for an effective inspection and replacement 




















































Figure. 4.5.  Annual failure rate in component population 
The analysis model can be used to provide further insight into component 
aging and failure rate. Considering the life expectancy as 40 years, the annual 
conditional failure rates are projected in Figure. 4.5 In early years, the conditional 
failure rate ranges from 3%-6%, but it declines rapidly after 20 years. The decline 
is due to the fact that most aged components have already vanished from the 
population leaving behind a much smaller cohort of relatively young components. 
In this analysis, component replacement is not considered. The analysis with 
component replacement is discussed in Section 4.4 using renewal theory. 
4.3.2.4 Summary 
A probabilistic model is presented for the estimation of the fraction of 
substandard components as well as the annual conditional failure rate.  
From the point of view of the risk of line failure, the cumulative (total) 
number of substandard components is relevant. The conditional failure rate on the 
other hand plays a role in the estimation of replacement rate, as shown in the next 
section. 
The number of substandard component is projected, which underscore the 
need for an effective component replacement program. Otherwise, the 
substandard component population would become so large that it would reduce 
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distribution network reliability and overwhelm maintenance activities in the 
future. 
4.3.3 Probabilistic Asset Management Model 
To maintain reliability of the distribution system network, an effective program 
for the replacement of substandard components is necessary. The replacement 
program has two main elements, namely the inspection interval and the 
component replacement rate.  
The section presents a probabilistic model to quantify the impact of the 
inspection interval and the annual component replacement rate, and relates these 
to limiting the risk that the substandard components in the population may pose to 
the system. A sequential inspection based replacement strategy is discussed in this 
section. This analysis is essential to support the life-cycle cost estimation model 
presented in the next section. 
4.3.3.1 Model for Sequential Inspection and Replacement Program 
This section presents a conceptual model of the sequential inspection and 
replacement program. A sequential program means that only a part of the 
component population is inspected in a given year, such that it takes T years to 
complete the inspection of the entire population. It is in contrast with maintenance 
strategies used in other industries (e.g., aerospace and chemical), in which an 
entire component population is inspected in a given year of inspection.  
To illustrate the concept of the sequential program, consider the case of a 5-
year inspection cycle as shown in Figure 4.6. To begin with (year 0), the 
distribution component population is basically divided into 5 blocks, and one 
block will be sequentially inspected each year. Substandard components found 
during an inspection will be replaced by new components (age 0). It means that 
component replacement takes place in the population block under inspection only. 
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In year 1, block-1 is inspected and due to component replacement, the 
average component age is reduced and its age distribution is modified. Population 
blocks 2-5 are unattended. 
In year 2, block-2 is subject to inspection and replacement, and blocks 1, 3-5 
are unattended. The substandard components continue to accumulate in blocks 3-
5. 
In year 3, block-3 is subject to inspection and replacement work. Components 
in block 4-5 are not inspected so far. Furthermore, previously inspected blocks 1-
2 experience progressive aging as well. However, the conditional failure rate in 
previously inspected blocks is expected to be smaller than that in non-inspected 
blocks. The difference between the two depends on the replacement rate during 
the inspection. 
The process continues as shown in Figure 4.6, and all the blocks are 
inspected at the end of year 5. However, substandard components are not 
completely eliminated from the population due to progressive component aging in 
previously inspected blocks 1-4. 
The inspection cycle continues to be repeated over the forecast period, 
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Figure 4.6: Illustration of component inspection and replacement strategy 
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4.3.3.2 Computation 
In a distribution network, consider that the total number of components to be 
managed is M. It is planned to inspect these components over an T year inspection 
interval, so that the component population is divided into T blocks. The number of 
components in each block is N = M/T. The component sample size for annual 
inspection is NI = N. The component replacement is carried out based on their 
condition. The blocks are inspected sequentially, and it takes T years to inspect 
the population completely. Considering a forecast period of TF (= 30 years), the 
number of inspection cycles = TF /T. 
The probabilistic analysis model is developed to estimate:  
(1) The number of remaining substandard components in the component 
population for a chosen inspection interval (T years). It is a proxy measure of 
residual risk or vulnerability to failure in the distribution network. 
(2) The component replacement rate in any given year, which is needed to 
compute the cost of component replacement. 
The proportion of components of age Xk in kth block turning into substandard 















=   (4.12) 
where fA(Xk) denotes the component age distribution at the time of reference t in a 
component block. Recall that S(t) is the survival probability.  
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The total number of substandard components in the entire population is the 
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The fraction of substandard components in the entire distribution population 
is given as 
M
tTNtQ iSS
),()( 1−=   (4.15) 
Note that T0 = 0. 
The number component replacement in a given year is an important input 
parameter for the cost analysis. If a population block were to be inspected in year 
t2 =t, the replacement rate with reference to the time of the previous inspection, t1 
= Ti-1, is estimated as  
),,(),( 1 tTkDtkD iSR −=   (4.16) 








),()(   (4.17) 
The population wide replacement rate is estimated as 
M
tNtQ RR
)()( =   (4.18) 
Since substandard components are replaced with new components at the time 
of inspection Ti, the age distribution of the component block population must be 
updated. Firstly, the age distribution is corrected to reflect the removal of 
substandard components from different age groups: 
),0,(),(),( 1 iSiAiA TXPTXfTXf −= −   (4.19) 
Despite the conceptual simplicity of this model, the computer implementation 
is somewhat involved due to the following reasons. The progressive aging of 
multiple component block populations has to be tracked over the forecast period. 
Furthermore, each block population has to be updated at the time of inspection. 
Updating the population has to be repeated several times over the forecast period. 
Because of the time-dependent nature of the problem, the number of substandard 
components and replacements is variable over time and population block. 
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4.3.3.3 Replacement Strategy 
In this strategy, only those components are replaced that are determined to be in 
substandard condition through inspection. This approach is economically 
beneficial because unnecessary component replacements are avoided. However, 
this approach has a drawback in case of a long inspection interval combined with 
an aged component population. The drawback is that it replaces substandard 
components that are present in the population only, but ignores components that 
have potential to reach end of life during the inspection interval. In summary, this 
strategy may not be effective when the inspection interval is long. 
4.3.3.4 Results 
4.3.3.4.1 General 
The section illustrates the effect of the inspection interval (cycle length) affects on 
the remaining number of substandard components, an indicator of risk, and the 
replacement rate, a measure of cost of replacement program.  
Table 4.2 describes three scenarios of the inspection program. The results are 
obtained corresponding to the component life expectancy of 40 years.  















1 30 5 6 20% 
2 30 15 2 6.67% 
3 30 25 1 4% 
 






























Figure. 4.7.  Remaining substandard components 
Figure. 4.7 show the effect of the inspection/replacement interval on the 
number of remaining substandard components as a percentage of the entire 
component population. It is obtained using the component life expectancy of 40 
years. In absence of a replacement program, the number of substandard 
components would increase rapidly. In a 30 year period, almost 90% of 
population would turn into a substandard state. A 15-year program can eliminate 
almost 80% of substandard components in a 30-year period. Naturally, the 
number of substandard components decreases as the inspection/replacement 
interval decreases (i.e., more frequent inspections). It however has an implication 
on the maintenance cost, which is discussed in the next section. 
4.3.3.4.3 Estimation of the Replacement Rate 
An important parameter for life-cycle cost estimation is the number of component 
replacements that are expected under different inspection interval (T). The effect 
of the replacement rate with the inspection interval is shown in Figure. 4.8. 
Initially the replacement rate in the 5-year program is the high due to frequent 
inspections and higher sample size. It however, declines after 10 years since 
population is substantially renewed in the first phase (t<10 years). The 


























Figure. 4.8.  Estimation of component replacement rate 
In the 15 year program, the replacement rate continuously increases in the fist 
cycle (t ≤15 year) and reaches the peak value of 3.5%. In the second phase, 
however, the replacement rate levels off at about 2%/year value. 
4.3.3.4.4 Summary 
The section presents a probabilistic model for the sequential inspection based 
component replacement program. The model provides estimates of the remaining 
number of substandard components, an indicator of risk, and the replacement rate, 
a measure of the cost of the replacement program. The model illustrates the effect 
of inspection interval and component life expectancy on these two parameters. 
The model is the basis for life-cycle risk and cost analysis presented in the next 
section. 
4.3.4 Life-Cycle Risk and Cost Estimation 
The section presents a model for estimating the life-cycle risk and costs associated 
with the management of the distribution component asset. This model would 
allow the optimization of the replacement program for minimizing the cost and 
achieving a target reliability level. 
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4.3.4.1 Life-Cycle Risk 
The substandard components are more vulnerable to failure under adverse 
weather conditions or an accidental overload. Therefore, as the number of 
substandard components increases in the distribution network, the risk of 
unexpected component failure also increases with it. In other words, the risk of 
component failure interrupting the electricity supply to customers is directly 
proportional to the number of substandard components in the population, which 
can be estimated from the model presented in this section.  
The actual probability of failure of a substandard component is rather 
difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, an average probability of failure can be 
roughly estimated from the currently available component failure data.  
Considering that approximately 250 component failures per year are currently 
attributed to substandard component, and that there are approximately 6% 
substandard components in 1.5 million distribution component population. The 
probability of failure is therefore estimated as PF = 250/(0.06 ×1.5 ×106) = 
2.77×10-3 ≈ 3×10-3 /substandard component/year. This estimate can be refined by 
a formal statistical analysis of historical component failure data and conducting a 
reliability analysis of component structure.  
Conceptually, the annual rate of component failure in a forecast year t is 
estimated as 
FSF PtQtQ ×= )()(   (4.20) 
where QS(t) is the total fraction of substandard components in the distribution 
population as given by Eq.(4.15).  
The economic cost of a component failure (CF $/component) includes the 
cost of emergency component replacement as well as the cost of supply 
interruption. The annual risk associated with an aging network is estimated as 
)()( tQCtR FFF =   (4.21) 
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4.3.4.2 Life-Cycle Cost 
The life-cycle cost includes both maintenance cost and risk. The maintenance cost 
has two major components:  
• Inspection Cost (CI). It mainly involves the labour cost of inspecting a 
component visually. 
• Preventive Replacement Cost (CR). It is the cost of planned (preventive) 
replacement of a substandard component, which includes the cost of 
component and labour.  
For a population of M components that is subject to an inspection and 
replacement cycle of T years, the annual maintenance cost (CM) per component in 
a forecast year t can be estimated as:  
)()( tQCQCtC RRIIM +=   (4.22) 
where QI  is the inspection sample expressed as a % of total population = 100/T 
%. The annual life-cycle cost (CT $ per component) in a forecast year t can be 
estimated as: 
)()()( tRtCtC FMT +=   (4.23) 
Note that annual risk RF(t), is computed from Eq.(4.21). 











)(   (4.24) 
where r is the annual interest rate. 
4.3.4.3 Results 
To illustrate the proposed model, life-cycle cost is estimated using the cost data 
shown in Table 4.3. All cost estimates are presented in a normalized form as $ per 








Inspection Cost (CI) 50 
Preventive Replacement Cost (CR) 1000 
Failure Cost (Emergency Replacement Cost CF) 6000 
Failure Probability Estimate (PF) 3×10-3 
 
The effect of replacement interval or inspection frequency on life cycle costs 
can be studied by applying the methodology described in Section 4.3.3 & 4.3.4. 
Firstly the annual maintenance cost over the forecast period calculated using 




























Figure. 4.9. Maintenance cost vs. inspection interval T 
The maintenance cost decreases as the inspection interval (T) is increased 
from 5 to 25 years Figure. 4.9. The reason for such trend can be seen from Figure. 


























Figure. 4.10. Risk vs inspection interval T 
The annual risk increases with increase in inspection interval as shown in 
Figure. 4.10. Because longer interval means a larger number of substandard 
components are vulnerable to failure. It must be stressed that the risk estimates are 
highly sensitive to the annual probability of failure of a substandard component, 


























Figure. 4.11. Life cycle cost vs inspection interval T 
The variation of life cycle cost, which is a sum of the maintenance cost and 
risk Eq.(4.23), and its net present value is shown in Figure. 4.11, which is 
qualitatively similar to the variation of maintenance cost shown in Figure. 4.9. 
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The reason is that the risk estimates typically ranging from $2 - $7 are much 
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Figure. 4.12. Net present value (NPV) of life cycle costs for various cases 
The net present value (NPV) of life cycle costs over a period of 30 years is 
illustrated here using Eq.(4.24). For the illustration purpose the annual interest 
rate is taken as 5%. For the case study considered as in Table 4.3 the net present 
value of the lifecycle costs over 30 year period is shown in Figure. 4.12. The NPV 
decreases with increase in replacement interval which suggests that higher 
replacement interval is more economical. Although these cost estimates are 
crucially dependent on input data, the risk (Figure. 4.10) appears to be smaller 
than the cost of maintenance (Figure. 4.9) program in this example. This 
observation underscores the need for a formal cost benefit analysis before 
implementing a particular maintenance strategy. 
Considering another case by changing the cost ratios, in this case considering 
30000=FC  and conducting the lifecycle cost analysis as in Eq.(4.24). The net 
present worth over a period of 30 years with replacement interval is shown in 
Figure. 4.12. In this case the higher failure costs have an effect on lifecycle costs. 
Figure. 4.12 suggests that the lifecycle costs decreases with replacement interval 
and have a minimum and again increases. The observation for this example 
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suggests that there is an optimal replacement interval of 13 years based on 
minimum life cycle costs for maintenance. 
It has been shown that the risk estimates are also sensitive to the annual 
probability of failure, another case is considered where the annual probability of 
failure of a substandard component as 2×10-2.  Similar calculations on lifecycle 
costs from Eq.(4.24) is done using the same input data from Table 4.3. The plot 
on lifecycle cost over a period of 30 year is shown in Figure. 4.12 with 
replacement interval on x-axis. The lifecycle costs here have a interesting profile 
and suggests an optimal replacement interval of 8 years. In this example for lower 
replacement interval the replacement costs dominate but in the later part when the 
replacement interval is high the failure costs dominate.  
4.3.4.4 Summary 
A probabilistic model is presented for the estimation of maintenance cost, risk and 
life-cycle cost associated with a maintenance program that involves sequential 
inspection based component replacement strategy.  
As a general rule, increasing the inspection interval decreases the 
maintenance cost at the expense of increasing risk.  
The time-dependent variation of life-cycle cost depends on the relative 
magnitude of risk and cost over time. 
The ratio of component failure cost to replacement cost (CF/CR) is a critical 
parameter. The cost ratio should be sufficiently high, otherwise the benefit of the 
maintenance program would be less than the associated cost. 
The risk and cost estimates presented here are considered illustrative, the 
input data pertaining to costs of inspection, replacement and failure of a 
distribution component can be arrived from field experts to get a more meaningful 
results. The estimation of probability of component failure must be refined 
through the statistical analysis of historical component failure data and/or 
structural reliability analysis of component structure. 
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4.4 Model Based on Renewal Theory  
4.4.1 Introduction 
A probabilistic method proposed by Van Noortwijk and Klatter, (2004) is 
presented to estimate the fraction of substandard component replacement in the 
distribution network based on current component demographics and lifetime 
distribution estimated from the inspection data. The results are then compared to 
the non-renewal case developed in Section 4.3.2. 
The component replacement is assumed to follow discrete renewal process. 
The probabilistic method predicts the expected number of component 
replacements per unit time, which is the annual rate of components reaching 
substandard state in a specified year. The assumptions in renewal process for 
replacements are that the substandard components are detected and replaced in a 
short period.  
A discrete renewal process {N(t), t=1,2,3,…} is a non-negative integer-
valued stochastic process that registers the successive renewals in the time 
interval (0, t]. The renewal times T1, T2, T3,…, is assumed to be non-negative 
independent and identically distributed with discrete probability function given as 
)0,,|1()0,,|(}Pr{ baiFbaiFpiT ik −−===   (4.25) 
,...,2,1=i  where pi represents the probability of a renewal in unit time i. This 
probability function is a discrete Weibull distribution. The conditional probability 
that the life time X exceeds x given X>y is given as 




















xybaxFyXxXP exp,,|1|   (4.26) 
The probability of a renewal of an aged component in future time x with 
current age y can be calculated using Eq. (4.26). The expected number of 










)]([1)]([   (4.27) 
for ,...3,2,1=n  and 0)0( ≡N . This equation is based on the condition that the first 
renewal occurred at time Ti. The expected long term average number of renewals 













nNE   (4.28) 
which is the reciprocal of mean lifetime μ . As ∞→n , the expected long term 
average cost per unit time approaches μ/c , where c is the cost associated with 
each renewal and is assumed as constant with time. The developed methodology 
can also be extended for a component which has aged 0≥y . The probability 








  (4.29) 
for ,...3,2,1=i . The expected number of renewals in the time interval (0, n] when 








)]([1)()],(~[   (4.30) 
where )]([ nNE  is given by Eq. (4.27). and ),(~ ynN  is called the delayed renewal 
process since the process starts at component age y. The expected cost of 
replacement from an aged population with current component ages myy ,...,1  can 








)],([)]([   (4.31) 
where cj is the cost of replacing the jth component. The expected cost of 
component replacement in unit time i can be obtained as 
niiKEiKE ,...,1)],1([)]([ =−−   (4.32) 
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For a unit cost of component replacement, Eq. (4.32) gives the rate of component 
replacement per unit time.  
4.4.2 Results 
Considering the population demographics and the estimated lifetime distribution 
as presented in Table 4.4, the replacement cost of the population per unit time in 
future can be calculated.  
Table 4.4.  Statistical input data for illustrative example 







Distribution 30 15 Weibull 
Lifetime 
Distribution 40 10 Weibull 
 
The average age of the remaining population is 30 years and the average 
lifetime of the component is 40 years. Assuming that all age components are 
replaced with a new component with unit cost (c=1). The expected replacement 
cost per unit time or the expected number of renewals per unit time for the 
population can be calculated from Eq. (4.32) which is shown in Figure 4.13. The 
year zero is the current year and Figure 4.13 shows the predictions for a forecast 
period of 150 years. Figure 4.13 shows the expected cost of replacement per year 
for the population as a function of current component age. 
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Figure 4.13: Expected cost of replacements per year as a function of age 
 The expected cost of replacements over all ages is shown in Figure 4.14. 
Figure 4.14 shows the expected cost of replacements per year over all ages of the 
population. The uncertainty in second replacement time is greater than the 
uncertainty in first replacement time. This kind of replacement is also termed as 
corrective replacement. The annual rate and hence the cost of corrective 
replacement policy can be shown by Figure 4.13 & Figure 4.14. It can be shown 
from Figure 4.14, that the expected number of replacements per year converges to 
0.025 which is equal to the expected long term average number of replacements 
(1/μ=0.025) as given in Eq. (4.28). 
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Figure 4.14: Expected cost of replacements per year among all ages 
It is interesting to compare the result in Figure 4.14 to the non-renewal case 
shown in Figure. 4.5, since they predict the same replacement rate until around 20 
years. The expected replacement rate decreases as the population ages but 
increases later with failure from first renewals and then converges to a constant 
replacement rate with subsequent renewals. Whereas in non-renewal case (Figure. 
4.5) the expected replacement rate decreases as there are no renewals. 
4.4.3 Summary 
A probabilistic model is presented for the estimation of the annual replacement 
rate of the population and the expected replacement cost per unit time. The 
component replacements are modeled as a renewal process, where a substandard 
component is replaced by a new component. For the component maintenance 
management, the annual rate of replacement and hence the replacement costs per 
year are crucial in optimizing the maintenance actions by minimizing the life 
cycle costs. 
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4.5 Imperfect Preventive Maintenance 
4.5.1 Background 
Let a component with lifetime variable “T” be maintained to reduce the risk of 
failure. To minimize the risk of failure, preventive maintenance is performed at 
regular intervals. There are two kinds of preventive maintenance (PM), namely 
proactive and reactive. Proactive preventive maintenance (PPM) is done before 
the initiation of degradation such that the time of initiation is delayed. Reactive 
preventive maintenance (RPM) is done after the initiation of degradation such that 
the rate of degradation is reduced. In this section RPM is discussed in the case of 
component maintenance optimization. Essential maintenance or refurbishment is 
done after a component has failed. Generally, the cost of refurbishment is very 
high compared to the cost of PM. Therefore, PM actions are necessary to reduce 
the cost of refurbishment. If PM actions are more frequent maintenance costs 
increases, thereby reducing the refurbishment costs. Likewise, when PM actions 
are less frequent, maintenance costs are less but refurbishment costs increase. 
Therefore, there is a need for optimizing the number of PM actions over a 
component lifetime.  
With preventive maintenance (RPM), a component is either as good as new 
(Perfect PM) or the rate of degradation is reduced (Imperfect PM). In case of 
perfect PM, the degradation of the component starts as if the component is new, 
this need not be true in reality. The effect of imperfect PM can be modeled as a 
virtual age model with a degree of imperfection (γ). Maintenance generally refers 
to as preventive maintenance in subsequent sections. 
4.5.2 Virtual Age Model 
A component with lifetime distribution )(tFT is considered by periodically 
maintaining at intervals pt . After the first preventive maintenance, the 
degradation of the component is reduced by the introduction of a virtual age to the 
component. The concept of virtual age has been thoroughly discussed in the 
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literature and has its applications in a variety of probabilistic models (Pham and 
Wang, 1996). The virtual age after first maintenance action )(1 tv  is given as 
ppp ttttttv 2)1()(1 <<−−= γ   (4.33) 
where pt  is the time of first maintenance and γ  is degree of maintenance 
imperfection ( 10 ≤≤ γ ). In case of perfect maintenance (i.e γ =0), the virtual age 
ptttv −=)(1  starts from zero age. In case of no maintenance (i.e γ =1), the virtual 
age ttv =)(1  is the same as the component age t. The virtual age model can then 






































































  (4.34) 
where )(tST  is the component survival function without maintenance. When there 
is no maintenance done on the component (i.e γ =1), the survival function results 
in )()( tStS Tt p = , the original survival function. In the case of perfect 
maintenance (i.e γ =0), the survival function is given by 
)()()( pTpTt ttStStS p −×=   (4.35) 
The methodology can be generalized for any number of preventive 
maintenance actions over the lifetime of the component. The virtual age of the 
component after j number of maintenance actions can be given as 
pppj tjtjtjtttv )1()1()( +<<−−= γ   (4.36) 
The component survival function after j number of preventive maintenance 




































When there is no maintenance done on the component (i.e γ =1), the survival 
function results in )()( tStS Tt p = , the original survival function. In the case of 
perfect maintenance (i.e γ =0), the survival function after jth PM is given by 
[ ] )()()( pTjpTt jttStStS p −×=   (4.38) 
The survival probability as shown in Eq. (4.38) is greatly improved with frequent 
preventive maintenance when compared with no maintenance. Even with frequent 
preventive maintenance actions the survival probability decreases with time but 
rather slowly as compared to no maintenance. 
The effect of imperfect preventive maintenance on survival probability is 
derived as in Eq. (4.37) and is very useful in maintenance optimizations decisions. 
The application of imperfect maintenance in maintenance optimization is 
illustrated by an example in the next section. 
4.5.3 Illustrative Example 
To illustrate the effect of imperfect preventive maintenance on component 
survival probability, a component with a mean lifetime of 36 years following 
Weibull distribution with shape parameter 3 and scale parameter 40 is considered. 
The component is maintained periodically at the interval ( pt ) of 10 years. Three 
scenarios of imperfect maintenance are considered here. In the first case, the 
component is maintained perfectly (i.e γ =0), the second case when the component 
is maintained imperfectly with γ =0.2 and the third when no maintenance work is 
done (i.e γ =1). For all the three cases the survival probability function is plotted 
in Figure 4.15 over 100 years. Figure 4.15 clearly shows the improvement in 
survival probability in the case of perfect maintenance and the effect of imperfect 
maintenance on the component survival. 
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tp→ PM Interval                 
γ→ Degree of PM Imperfection
 
Figure 4.15: Survival probability curves in case of imperfect maintenance 
The model can be used to quantify the effect of maintenance imperfection on 
component survival for life cycle management. The model can be used for each 
component in the system or the lifetime distribution of the whole system. The 
models flexibility can be exploited in various types of maintenance actions and to 
vary the effect of maintenance at each interval. Finally, the model can be helpful 
especially in component or system lifecycle management. 
4.5.4 Cost Optimization 
The effect of preventive maintenance of a system with lifetime of 100 years is 
studied by Yang et al. (2006). The survival function of the system is defined by a 
Weibull distribution with shape parameter 2.86 and scale parameter 94.34. The 
effect of preventive maintenance on the system is modeled according to Eq(4.37). 
Preventive maintenance actions are applied periodically at time intervals pt  of 2, 
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 75 and 100 years. Yang et al. (2006) demonstrated 
the effect of perfect preventive maintenance to the problem described above. The 
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analysis conducted in this section extends this approach for the case of imperfect 
preventive maintenance actions. 
The unit cost of failure is considered as 100 and the maintenance cost is varied to 
study for various cost ratios. The failure costs are calculated based on the 
probability of failure at the end of system lifetime of 100 years. The maintenance 
costs are calculated based on the number of maintenance actions at the end of 
system lifetime. Hence, the total cost at the end of system lifetime of 100 years is 
taken as the sum of failure cost and maintenance cost. The optimal maintenance 
interval is found to be the maintenance interval that leads to lowest total cost 

































Cost Ratio =Maintenance Cost/Failure Cost
OMI = Optimal Maintenance Interval
Weibull Lifetime
Mean = 84 Years
Analysis period = 100 years
Failure cost = 100
69.3
 
Figure 4.16: Optimal preventive maintenance 
The optimal maintenance policy of the system for the various cost ratios 
considered is shown in Figure 4.16. The plot shows the effect of imperfect 
maintenance for two scenarios. The results from Figure 4.16 suggest that there is 
less effect on the optimal maintenance intervals but there is a significant 
difference in the optimal cost. Figure 4.16 illustrates the concept of an imperfect 
preventive maintenance model in maintenance optimization of systems.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
The effect of maintenance actions can be quantified using probabilistic models for 
life cycle costs and equipment performance. This chapter discusses such 
application of maintenance models through the probabilistic approach, using 
component lifetime distributions. 
 Age-based replacement policy is simple and effective to implement in a 
system with a large population of relatively inexpensive components. An optimal 
age-based refurbishment policy for wood pole management is presented. For a 
cost ratio of CP/CF = 0.2, the optimal replacement age is estimated at 40 years. An 
interesting conclusion is that the type of lifetime distribution (Weibull, Gompertz 
or Log-logistic) has a limited sensitivity to the optimum replacement age and the 
expected life-cycle cost. 
A sequential inspection-based replacement model is proposed to manage 
components from a large distribution network. The model is demonstrated to 
show the effect of an inspection interval in estimating the maintenance cost, risk, 
and life cycle costs. This approach is applicable to distributed populations in 
which inspections are scheduled as blocks of the populations. This approach is 
computationally complex and needs realistic cost input data to support decision 
making. As a general rule, increasing the inspection interval decreases the 
maintenance cost at the expense of increasing risk. The time-dependent variation 
of life-cycle cost depends on the relative magnitude of risk and cost over time. 
A rather simplistic approach, in which components are replaced as they are 
detected to be in substandard state (Corrective Replacement), is demonstrated 
using renewal theory. The component replacement policy from renewal theory 
framework is presented in estimating the future expected replacement costs.   
A probabilistic lifetime model is proposed to consider the effect of imperfect 
preventive maintenance on systems and components. The model has the 
flexibility to incorporate the imperfections of maintenance actions using the 
concept of virtual age. The model can consider the effect of maintenance 
imperfections at various maintenance intervals. The effect of imperfect preventive 
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maintenance in maintenance optimization is illustrated. The results show that 
imperfect preventive maintenance increases optimal total costs and the frequency 




CHAPTER 5  
STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR PITTING CORROSION 
IN STEAM GENERATORS 
5.1 Background 
The Steam generators (SG) are the most critical component of nuclear power 
reactor next to reactor core as shown in Figure 5.1. They are large heat 
exchangers that use the heat from primary coolant to produce steam in secondary 
side that is sent to steam turbines to produce electricity. A nuclear power plant 
may have multiple steam generators that are of shell-and-tube type heat 
exchangers each consisting of several thousand tubes. The steam generator tubes 
function as part of the nuclear reactor primary heat transport system pressure 
boundary. These tubes are generally thin walled for efficient heat transfer from 
primary side to the secondary side. In order to act as an effective barrier these 
tubes should be free of cracks, perforations and general degradation.  
 
Figure 5.1: CANDU nuclear power plant (from http://canteach.candu.org/) 
However in the past the steam generator tubes have experienced widespread 
degradation as observed at nuclear power plants [IAEA, 1997]. The degradation 
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mechanisms occur due to various factors such as: the material characteristics, 
operating and maintenance environment, water chemistry to name a few. Various 
degradation mechanisms affecting steam generator tubing are stress corrosion 
cracking, fretting, pitting, denting, erosion-corrosion, and fatigue as shown in 
Figure 5.2. Steam generators being critical components of nuclear power plant 
and the tubes being part of the primary pressure boundary can contribute 
significantly to plant outages due to tube leaks or rupture. Thus the risk of tube 
leak or rupture results in overall plant risk leading to plant shutdown. However, 
the utilities adopt various remedial and maintenance actions to reduce the risk of 
tube leak in order to ensure safe and reliable operation over its intended designed 
life.   
 
Figure 5.2: Steam generator degradation mechanisms (Maruska, 2002) 
The degradation of steam generators has led to forced outages of nuclear 
power plants resulting in loss of revenue, and increase in the maintenance costs. 
Hence utilities resort to strategic life management process to efficiently run steam 
generators over its expected lifetime. Thus the major goals of the life management 
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strategies are to avoid surprises, learn from experience and manage the investment 
in steam generators (Tapping et al., 2000) in the most optimal way.  
The methodology in implementing life management strategies is to first 
characterize the possible degradation mechanisms effecting the steam generator 
life and reliability.  In order to achieve this, a sound fitness-for-service (FFS) plan, 
and good inspection capability is important. The possible remedial and 
maintenance actions are then assessed based on their merits in extending the 
service life of steam generator. The maintenance actions are then ranked based on 
risk reduction and cost effectiveness. However, even with best efforts on effective 
maintenance strategies uncertainties still lie with the aging of steam generators. 
The uncertainties also associated with how the flaws are characterized, detected, 
and mitigated. The success of life management strategies depend on minimizing 
these uncertainties. A risk based approach is therefore critical to life management 
strategies for its success.  Such approach accounts for various uncertainties and 
quantifies them through probabilistic models for better decision making.  
Pitting corrosion is a predominant form of degradation on the outside 
diameter (OD) of steam generator tubing of some nuclear power plants. This 
Chapter discusses the application of stochastic models for pitting corrosion 
degradation towards steam generator life cycle management.  
5.1.1 Pitting Corrosion 
During the course of normal operation of a nuclear power plant the impurities 
from make up water, the condenser leaks and the corrosion product oxides 
leached from feed train structural materials are carried along the feed water and 
get deposited over the steam generator surfaces. These deposits lead to problems 
such as under deposit pitting, tube failures and loss of production. The regions 
near the sludge pile at tube sheet and support plate experience crevice like 
conditions which favour pitting corrosion.  
The pits are characterised as wide mouthed, dish shaped with low aspect ratio 
which could be described as localised wastage. Pitting corrosion typically occurs 
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at locally weak spots on tube where the passive layer breaks creating a local 
corrosion cell which is promoted by the presence of chloride and sulphate ions. 
The impurities such as sulphates and chlorides are produced from condenser leaks 
and chemicals used in chemical cleaning which result in local acidic conditions 
favourable to pitting process. The pitting process is accelerated in the presence of 
oxidizing conditions and copper deposits (IAEA, 1997). The accumulations of 
sludge act as barrier to diffusion accelerating the pitting process by enhancing 
chemical concentration. 
The redox potential of the solution should exceed a critical value for the pits 
to initiate. This potential can be achieved by the presence of dissolved oxygen, 
oxidizing metal cations like FeCl3 or CuCl3 of higher redox potential than critical 
potential are more conducive to rapid pitting than dissolved oxygen. Any 
movement in the solution can remove the local concentration of Cl- and H+ ions 
that is required to continuous propagation thereby stopping pitting (Burstein et al., 
1994). Laboratory studies and field observations have shown that the pitting rate 
could be very high resulting in through wall failure in a matter of days (Angell, 
2002).  
Severe pitting has been experienced in SG tubes in some nuclear reactors. 
Pitting observed in CANDU unit is described as under deposit pitting corrosion 
which is contributed due to presence of porous adherent deposits. The utility 
adopt aggressive water lancing and chemical cleaning to remove most of the 
deposits thereby mitigating pitting. Lancing uses high pressure jets to 
mechanically remove sludge from tube surfaces. By periodic lancing the depth of 
sludge is kept at reasonable levels. More advanced lancing equipment is used with 
multidirectional pressurized water jets which could remove tenacious sludge 
deposits (IAEA, 1997). Chemical cleaning is always preceded by water lancing 
such that they allow cleaning chemicals to access the crevices. 
5.1.1.1 Chemical Cleaning 
The sludge and deposits consist of feedtrain corrosion products (e.g., Fe3O4, 
Fe2O3, Cu, Cu2O, CuO), impurities from condenser cooling water (e.g., SiO2), and 
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water treatment chemicals (e.g., sodium phosphate). The chemical cleaning 
process commonly used is based on EPRI-SGOG (Electric Power Research 
Institute – Steam Generator Owners’ Group) which is generally applied during 
plant outage (Semmler et al., 1998). If Cu is present an oxidizing step is applied 
whereas a reducing step dissolves Fe oxides. Of the various chemical cleaning 
formulations, the EDTA (Ethylene Diamine Tetra Acetic Acid) formulations are 
more popular in chemical cleaning of steam generators (Padma et al., 2001). The 
composition of chemical cleaning formulation consists of additives added to 
EDTA such as pH additive, reducing agent, oxidizing agent, and corrosion 
inhibitors. The compositions and conditions of chemical cleaning process are 
usually specific for a particular SG depending on the materials used and operating 
environment. Such chemical cleaning process has successfully been implemented 
by power utilities in extending the life of steam generators (Evans et al., 2002, 
Maruska, 2002). 
5.1.1.2 Eddy Current Inspection 
The most common tool for in-service inspection of SG tubing are eddy current 
probes which consists of small electrical coil enclosed in the probe head 
connected to an electric circuit. Eddy current probes are electro-magnetically 
coupled to the test specimen and generate eddy currents flowing in a direction 
parallel to the coil windings. An eddy current signal results from the disturbance 
in the magnetic field caused by the defect interfering with the eddy currents 
generated by the probe as it scans the defect. The amplitude and phase of the 
signal reflect the amplitude and phase of the affected part of the three dimensional 
eddy current field. The signal has a characteristic pattern that is used in 
identifying the type of defect.  
The two basic types of eddy current probes used in SG inspection are 
“impedance” and “transmit-receive”. The eddy current signals measured from the 
primary coil electric impedance induced by the eddy current magnetic field are of 
the impedance probes. In a transmit-receive (T/R) probe, the transit coil generates 
magnetic field and the eddy current signals are measured as the change in voltage 
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induced in the receive coil. The transmit-receive probe has proved to have a 
greater scope in eddy current testing and is currently used in most modern probes 
(Obrutsky, L., 2002).  
Eddy current signal parameters are affected mainly by 
• Tube thickness 
• Defect type, size and orientation 
• Test frequency of coil 
• Magnetic properties of the material 
The eddy current amplitude decays exponentially with depth from the surface 
of the probe and phase lag increases linearly with depth. The frequency of the test 
coil is selected based on the thickness of the tube, resistivity and permeability of 
tube material. It is quite common to use multiple frequencies on the same coil to 
test the probe characteristics (probe calibration) and also in characterizing various 
types of defects. Eddy current signals from a single coil are actually absolute 
measurements and are so called absolute probes. The differential probe consists of 
two coils side by side that measure the differential signal which is much sensitive 
to defects and insensitive to slowly varying properties like gradual dimensional or 
temperature variations and probe wobble. It’s also common to have both absolute 
and differential setup in the same probe taking advantage of each. The three 
common types of probes used at CANDU steam generator tube inspection 
discussed in this Chapter are Carter-1, Carter 2 - Cecco 4, and X - Probe. There 
are a number of eddy current probes developed for specific applications and 
defect characteristics. 
5.1.1.2.1 Carter-1 Bobbin Probe 
The CTR-1-350, or Carter 1 probe uses absolute and differential bobbin coils that 
are coaxial with the inspected tube. The induced eddy current flows 
circumferentially in the steam generator tube, parallel to the coil windings. Hence 
these probes are not sensitive to circumferentially oriented defects. Bobbin probes 
are very good at volumetric defects. The volumetric material loss at a given 
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location is estimated by comparing the probe signal to amplitude calibration 
curves. The signal amplitude is sensitive to the morphology and circumferential 
extent of the flaw which could lead to potential sizing error. The main advantage 
of the bobbin probe is its speed which allows inspection in a short period of time 
thereby reducing unavailability and outage times. 
5.1.1.2.2 Carter 2 - Cecco 4 Transmit-Receive Probe 
The CTR2-C4, or Carter 2 – Cecco 4 probe is a multi-coil (array) transmit/receive 
eddy current probe, consisting of small coils aligned in the axial direction along 
the probe. Similar to the CTR-1 probe, the CTR2-C4 probe is generally not 
sensitive to degradation modes such as circumferential cracking, however it can 
detect multiple volumetric flaws such as corrosion pits at the same axial location 
around the circumference of the tube. Because of the multi-coil design, the CTR2-
C4 probe has been shown to detect corrosion pits with higher accuracy, with 
negligible change in operational speed. 
5.1.1.2.3 Transmit-Receive type X-Probe 
The X-probe is a fast single-pass transmit/receive eddy current probe that 
combines the circumferential and axial modes in a single probe head. X-probe has 
a number of transmit/receive coils varying from 8 to 18 depending on probe 
diameter. The probe has a scanning speed comparable to the standard bobbin 
probes that is able to discriminate between axial, circumferential, and volumetric 
flaws in a single scan. X-probe is used in field recently and is only used at 
specific sections which need attention. X-probe is believed to characterize defects 
better than other probes available as it has greater resolution and stores lots of 
information on tube characteristics since it has more number of coils. 
5.1.2 LCM Strategies 
The goal of the steam generator life cycle management is to maximize value 
while ensuring safe and reliable operation until the expected end of life. The 
purpose of life cycle management plan is to provide both near term and short term 
strategies for inspection, cleaning, and modifications necessary for safe and 
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reliable operation. The objectives and scope of LCM plans is discussed in Chapter 
Chapter 2. In this section LCM strategies currently implemented in steam 
generator corrosion management is discussed. 
5.1.2.1 Current LCM Strategies 
The current steam generator remedial actions include extensive cleaning 
campaigns with the use of specialized water lancing equipment at low and high 
temperature chemical cleaning. Enhanced inspection is essential for an effective 
maintenance strategy. Advanced inspection technique such as X-probe is used for 
more rapid and accurate inspections. Degraded tubes are removed for 
metallographic assessments and fitness for service evaluations. Particular 
attention is given to chemistry control with improved water treatment plants and 
condenser. The copper components from the feedtrain and condenser are replaced. 
Much emphasis is given in maintaining chemistry specifications in secondary side 
chemistry within guidelines while maintaining high hydrazine chemistry regime. 
Currently work is undergoing on the development of tube sleeving in repairing the 
plugged tubes. 
5.1.2.2 Fitness for Service Assessment 
A sound fitness for service program is essential in characterizing degradation 
mechanisms. Fitness for service guidelines are therefore developed for each plant 
since the degradation mechanisms vary for each plant. Fitness for service 
assessment along with structural integrity and operational assessment is 
conducted at each inspection campaign to demonstrate the ability of steam 
generator to function safely until next inspection outage. The utility considers the 
primary objective of fitness for service is same as life cycle management; to 
assure the integrity of steam generators as a primary pressure and containment 
boundary, the difference being the time span of application.   
5.1.2.3 LCM Issues 
The utilities were successful in mitigating pitting degradation with aggressive 
cleaning campaigns and efficient chemistry control. Despite the remedial actions 
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new pits initiate and continue to grow rapidly. This presents a major challenge for 
steam generator LCM in predicting future equipment performance, estimating the 
remaining life, and the adverse economic consequences. The ageing of steam 
generator under pitting corrosion is not fully understood. Uncertainties also exist 
on how the flaws are characterized, detected and mitigated. A risk based approach 
is therefore essential for efficient life cycle management program which accounts 
for various uncertainties and to quantify them. A probabilistic based framework 
for pitting corrosion degradation is discussed in next section based on eddy 
current inspection data. 
5.2 Stochastic Modelling of Pitting Corrosion 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The risks associated with steam generator tube pitting corrosion can be quantified 
through stochastic modelling. Estimating the expected number of tubes that 
require plugging and the probability of tube leakage in the future operating period 
are important input to risk based life-cycle management of steam generators 
(Harris, et al., 1997). When the extent of pitting is unacceptable, then the need for 
maintenance activities such as water lancing or chemical cleaning should be 
assessed in a risk-based framework. The model should be able to assess the 
impact of maintenance interval on the risk associated with the event of tube 
leakage and be able to carry out the cost benefit analysis. In technical terms, 
answering these questions requires distributions pit size, and rate of new pit 
generation. The objective of this study is to discuss various uncertainties with 
inspection data and develop probabilistic models to estimate probability 
distributions from existing inspection data and apply them to life cycle 
management. 
5.2.1.1 Pit Generation Models 
Localized pitting corrosion process is considered to have stochastic character in 
nature. Existing models are developed in idealized setting which utilizes 
laboratory data obtained from continuous monitoring of pit initiation and 
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propagation using potentiometers. As passivation breaks down, the potential 
difference increases sharply. This potential (pitting potential) depends on the 
nature and composition of the solution. Likewise the time interval needed to 
observe the drastic increase in potential is taken as the induction time.  Stochastic 
models based on the statistical distribution of pitting potential and induction times 
for pit formation are proposed from such experimental observations (Shibata, 
1996; Mola et al., 1990; Wu et al., 1997). The process of pit generation is 
modelled as a pure birth stochastic model. Opposite to pit formation, passive layer 
healing operates as a pit death process. These models are useful in investigating 
the experimental procedures in electrochemical systems. Such models may not be 
applicable in field applications because it’s not practical to monitor the pitting 
potential in steam generator tubes. 
Markov process model for the growth of maximum pit depth was discussed 
by Provan and Rodriguez, (1989) applied to oil and gas pipelines where corrosion 
is a very slow process. Hong, (1999) proposes the use of combined model by 
representing the pit generation process with Poisson model and the pit depth 
growth process by Markov process. The combined model is reported to give 
better estimate for the problems discussed by Provan and Rodriguez, (1989). 
These models are not directly applicable in analyzing pitting problems in steam 
generator for the reasons discussed in Section 5.1.1.  
Pit generation and growth is fairly rapid in some CANDU reactors. It is 
believed oxygen intake during shut down and start-up cycles promotes the pitting, 
which is a kind of inter-granular attack. The time of rapid growth is random and 
then growth stops. There is evidence to suggest that most pits don’t grow after 
this initial period of generation and growth. Thus pit size also becomes a random 
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Figure 5.3: Plot to illustrate marked point process for pits > 50%tw 
Model pit initiation is random in time and pit assumes a random size from a 
distribution. Small size pits can not be reliably detected or measured. The focus of 
attention is on relatively large pits of size (≥ 50% tw). The idea is that pits 
exceeding a relatively high threshold (50%) follow the Poisson process as shown 
in extreme value theory (Smith, 2004). The pit generation is assumed to follow 
Poisson process which falls under stochastic birth process. The pit generation 
model following NHPP is discussed in next section along with parameter 
estimation from observed inspection data. 
5.2.2 Stochastic Pit Generation 
Let the number of pits N(t) in the interval [0-t] follow a Non-Homogenous 
Poisson Process (NHPP) with intensity function )(tλ . The mean value function 
)(tΛ  or the expected number of pits E[N(t)] per SG following Weibull Power law 







αλ    (5.1) 
The parameters α, is a scale parameter and β is the shape parameter. When shape 
parameter β=1, the intensity function is constant and the process is defined as a 
Homogeneous Poisson process (HPP).  
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5.2.3 Inspection Process 
In practice it is quite difficult and uneconomical to inspect the equipment 
continuously with time. Inspection of equipment is usually conducted at periodic 
or non periodic inspection time intervals. Consider an inspection process of a 
single SG from the start of its operation as shown in Figure 5.4, where non-






















Figure 5.4: SG pitting corrosion inspection data 
The number of pits observed at time t2 is the number of new pits generated 
during the interval [t1-t2]. The number of pits generated during inspection interval 
[t1-t2] follows a Poisson distribution which is given as 







==− Λ−Λ−   (5.2) 
If at the time of inspection t3 there are no observed new pits, such kind of 
data are called censored data. The censored data gives us the information that 
there are no new pits observed in the interval [t2-t3] with probability given as 
{ } 23)]()([23 230)()( ttetNtNP tt >==− Λ−Λ−   (5.3) 
By assuming a probability model for pit generation rate, the probability of 
observing these pits in an inspection process as shown in Figure 5.4 is calculated 
by a likelihood method. The parameters of the model are then estimated by 
maximizing this likelihood function. The theory and methodology of likelihood 
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method is explained further in subsequent sections. The advantage of likelihood 
method is that it can handle censored data. 
5.3 Estimation of Pit Generation Rate 
From inspection data, the number of pits generated in different intervals can be 
obtained as shown in Figure 5.4 throughout the service life of the system. 
Suppose in a kth interval [tk1-tk2], nk pits are generated and that there are in 
total M intervals for which data are available.  The maximum likelihood function 




















βα   (5.4) 
By substituting the mean rate function, the log-likelihood is derived as 
























αβα   (5.5) 
The unknown parameters are estimated from the conditions of maximization as 
{ }



























































The parameters βα ˆ,ˆ  can be estimated by trial and error from Eq. (5.6). 
Standard maximization codes can also be applied to Eq. (5.5) to estimate the 
parameters. The Fisher information matrix is derived as the negative of the second 
derivative of the log likelihood function with respect to the parameters. The 
asymptotic covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimators is an inverse 
of the Fisher information matrix. Using the estimates of asymptotic variance, the 
approximate confidence limits for the distribution parameters can be obtained 
under the assumption of normality. 
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5.3.1 Test for Homogenous Poisson process 
In case of the HPP model (β=1), the pit generation rate is constant with time.  A 
statistical test, such as the likelihood ratio test, can be applied to test the null 
hypothesis that β=1.  The likelihood ratio statistic (LRS) is given as 
{ }),1(),1(2 0011 αβαβ =−≠−= llLRS    (5.7) 
where ),1( 00 αβ =l  and ),1( 11 αβ ≠l  are the log likelihood functions for the 
homogeneous and non-homogeneous Poisson process models, respectively. The 
LRS follows the Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. The null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5 % level of significance when p-value is less than 
5%, and it can be concluded that the pit generation rate is not constant or 
otherwise. 
5.4 Extreme Pit Depth Model 
5.4.1 Pit Depth Distribution 
The pit depths are measured using NDE techniques which are used to evaluate 
flaw distribution in tubes. The measured pit depths pose challenge in modeling 
probability distribution as they are associated with detection uncertainty and 
measurement error. Measured pit depths of size less than 30% through wall depth 
(TWD) is based on expert judgment due to relatively small size of pits for a tube 
of wall thickness in range of 1-2 mm. All new pits greater than 50% TWD is 
considered for the analysis as the measurement error effects are minimal to larger 
pits. Pit depths exceeding a threshold of 50% TWD can be treated as extreme (or 
peaks) of the pit generation process. The distribution of these peaks over the 
threshold can be modeled using the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), 
commonly used in the extreme value theory (Smith, 2004). The generalized 
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where σ  is the scale parameter and ξ  is the shape parameter. When 0≤ξ , the 
GPD has a long and unbounded tail. When 0>ξ , the distribution is right 
bounded at ξσ / . In the limiting case when 0→ξ  the distribution takes 
exponential with mean equal to σ . When 1=ξ , GPD model becomes the 
uniform distribution. The GPD model is commonly used in extreme value 
analysis of engineering and environmental systems (Smith, 2004). 
The distribution parameters can be estimated by method of moments using 
the sample mean (m) and standard deviation (s) computed from the pit depth data 


















umξ   (5.9) 
( )( )ξσ +−= 1um   (5.10) 
5.4.2 Extreme Pit Depth Distribution 
In order to estimate probability of the tube leakage in a steam generator, the 
distribution of the largest (extreme) pit size is required. Since the pit occurrence is 
described by a non-homogeneous Poisson (Weibull) process, the rate of 
occurrence of pits exceeding a size z at time t is given as 
)](1)[()( zFtt Xz −= λλ   (5.11) 
The expected number of pits exceeding depth >z % TWD in the interval [0-t] per 
SG, i.e, the mean rate function, is given as 
[ ])(1)()()]([ zFtttNE Xzz −Λ=Λ=   (5.12) 











=   (5.13) 
From the principles of extreme value theory, the distribution of the largest pit 



















  (5.14) 
The distribution )(zFY  is also referred to as the Generalized Extreme Value 
(GEV) distribution, which encompasses all three limiting forms of the extreme 
value distributions, namely, the Gumbel, Frechet and Weibull distributions (Smith, 
2004). It can be used to estimate the probability of tube leakage per operating year. 
If the reactor unit has n number of SGs, each with leak probabilities 
iL
p  
acting as a series system independent of each other, then the probability of having 











)1(1   (5.15) 
The number of extreme pits for the Unit is actually a sum of independent 
Poisson processes from all SGs. The expected number of extreme pits with depth 





+++=   (5.16) 
The expected number of extreme pits per unit can be used in developing unit 
life-cycle management plans. 
5.5 Gamma Frailty Poisson Model 
The Poisson models discussed earlier in the preceding sections are proposed in the 
context of pitting corrosion process. The pitting observed from a single SG is 
usually in negligible amount considering large pits. Pitting processes from all the 
SGs in a reactor unit are assumed as realizations from a random pitting process 
model of a single SG. It is quite reasonable to pool the data from all the SGs of a 
reactor unit to model the random pitting process of a single SG. However the 
unobserved randomness among the different SGs can be accounted for using 
frailty model. Such frailty Poisson models are used in demographic studies such 
as in panel count data (Lawless, 1987, Zhang and Jamshidian, 2003). The frailty 
model on Poisson process is defined as 
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)()|)(()|( 0 ttNEt Λ==Λ γγγ                                                                        (5.17) 
where the frailty random variable γ  follows Gamma ( δδ /1, ) distribution with 
mean as one and variance δ . The unconditional mean function is thus 
)())(( 0 ttNE Λ=  which can be considered to follow power law model given in 
Eq. 5.17. The unconditional probability of observing n pits in time [0, t] can be 
derived as 
( ) [ ]





















nntN                                              (5.18) 
The probability of observing number of pits in an interval shown in Eq. 5.18 
is actually follows a negative binomial distribution. The frailty random variable 
usually introduces greater dispersion in observing the number of pits in an interval. 
Such high variance is observed from data obtained by industry and is usually 
modeled as negative binomial distribution (Camacho and Pagan, 2006). Hence 
frailty model seems to be appropriate in case of relatively insufficient 
observations of pitting corrosion from steam generators. Such frailty models can 
be directly applied in modeling pitting corrosion and the parameters are estimated 
by Maximum Likelihood method as described in Section 5.3. 
5.6 Some Results Applicable to Life Cycle Management  
5.6.1 Time to First Leak 
The probabilistic pitting corrosion model developed in Section 5.2.2 can be 
further applied in estimating the time to first failure distribution. The definition of 
failure is taken in general, which can be considered as the leak criterion or the 
plugging criterion. Let T1 denote the time from 0=t  until the first failure. The 
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Where )(tN z  is the number of failures at time t, and )(tzΛ  is the mean value 
function of extreme pits. The expected time to failure can now be calculated by 







tz   (5.20) 
If the mean value function follows Weibull power law as shown in Eq. (5.1), 
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Considering the generalized Pareto distribution for the pit depth as discussed 
in Section 5.4.1 and NHPP model for pit generation discussed in Section 5.2.2, 


















etTP   (5.23) 
5.6.2 Time to nth Failure/Leak 
The probabilistic corrosion pitting model can be used in estimating the time to nth 
failure distributions. Let nS  denote the time until failure n for ,...,2,1=n  where 



















  (5.24) 
The expected time to nth failure can be calculated by integrating the survival 





















  (5.25) 
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Considering the generalized Pareto distribution for the pit depth discussed in 
Section 5.4.1 and NHPP model for pit generation discussed in Section 5.2.2, the 



















































5.7 Uncertainties Associated with Pit Depth Model 
Eddy current (ET) inspection process is aimed to produce reliable information for 
engineers to ensure structural integrity of SG. However there are various 
uncertainties involved in each stage of inspection process that hinders the overall 
reliability of ET inspection process. The major reliability issues of eddy current 
inspection relevant for engineers are the detectability and accuracy issues. It is 
required that defects greater than critical size should be detected by ET 
inspection. The detectability issue is addressed using Probability of Detection 
(POD) curves for the technique as well as for analysis/analyst. The major factors 
that affect POD are 
• Probe sensitivity to defect orientation 
• Human factors 
• Poor signal to noise ratio 
• Material characteristics 
• Probe wear 
• Internal and external deposits 
• Scan rate 
Most of the factors discussed above are minimized by selecting an 
appropriate probe and better inspection procedures. Even with the best efforts in 
minimizing the uncertainties there still lies a residual uncertainty that constitute 
toward inspection reliability. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate the POD 
curves for the inspection process along with the inspection results.  
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Sizing accuracy reveal how close the technique defect size match to that of 
true defect size. The sizing accuracy is addressed by means of root mean squared 
error (RMSE) by comparing eddy current measurements to that of the actual 
depths from a pulled tube. The major factors affecting the accuracy of eddy 
current technique are 
• Defects on Calibrated tube may not depict actual defects on field 
• Probe wear 
• Signal to noise ratio 
• Human factors 
Most of the factors can be minimized by selecting an appropriate probe and 
by customizing calibration standards. As discussed above for detection 
uncertainty, it is difficult eliminate uncertainties completely. It is therefore 
necessary to demonstrate the sizing accuracy of the inspection process along with 
the eddy current inspection results.  
The effects of sizing accuracy and detectability are minimized when 
considering relatively larger pit depths. The effect of sizing accuracy on pit depth 
distribution is illustrated in Section 5.8. The pit depths with size ≥50%tw are 
considered for modelling the depth distribution. Generalized Pareto distribution is 
considered for modelling pit depths exceeding a threshold of 50%tw as discussed 
in Section 5.4.1. 
5.7.1 Measurement Error Analysis from Field Inspections 
The probabilistic model for pit depth should take into account the measurement 
error in Non-destructive test (NDT) tool. Statistical methods have been used for 
evaluation of measurement error from such NDT tools by laboratory studies. The 
statistical methods applicable in Non-destructive evaluation (NDE) are reviewed 
by Olin&Meeker (1996) and Sweeting (1995). They show the application of 
regression models on the measured flaws and the true flaws in characterizing the 
measurement errors of NDT tools. Inspection data on flaws using multiple NDT 
tools can also be used in characterizing the measurement error of each tool. In this 
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section such application in nuclear steam generator tubes non-destructive 
inspection are discussed. 
Non-destructive inspection of steam generator tubes has played a major part 
in its safe and successful operation. Periodic inspection database on SG tubes 
reveal corrosion pit depth measurements from various eddy current probes. In 
some cases corrosion pits are measured using multiple probes to gain more insight, 
especially on larger pit depths which could potentially leak. The corrosion pit 
depth data measured from multiple eddy current probes can be used to quantify 
the measurement error for each measuring probe. The EPRI guidelines for 
inspection of SG only refer to root mean squared error/differential (RMSE/D) in 
accessing the quality of an inspection instrument. The methodology discussed 
here follows the paper from Morrison, et al. (2002) where he discusses the 
application of Grubbs Method from multiple inspection data.  
5.7.1.1 Estimation of Measurement Errors from Inspection Data for Each of 
Two Probes 
The root mean squared error/differential (RMSE/D) calculates the total scatter 
from the two tools being compared. If the measured values from Probe 1 and 









2)(1/   (5.27) 
From RMSE/D it is not possible to decompose the total scatter and assign it to 
each tool. This approach is helpful only if one of the measuring probe is assumed 
to be perfect. In most of the cases this approach penalizes bad probe unnecessarily 
by assigning the total scatter to bad probe.  
5.7.1.2 Grubbs Method 
Grubbs (1948) suggested the use of sample variance and covariance to estimate 
measurement errors for individual probes. The measured pit depths (xi, yi) from 
each probe is assumed to follow the model given as 
 127
2211 and, iiiiii eyex ++=++= αμαμ   (5.28) 
where iμ  is the true value for the i
th pit depth, 1α  and 2α  are the constant biases 
and 1ie  and 2ie  are the measurement error (ME) in observing iμ . It is assumed 
that the ME of a probe is independent of the true value of the pit depth and is also 
independent of the ME for the other probe. The randomness in ME is assumed to 
follow normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ . The 
variance of measured pit depths ( 22
222
1
22 ; σσσσσσ μμ +=+= yx ) consists of the 
variance of the true value of pit depth and the variance of measurement error of its 
measuring probe. The covariance between the observed measurements 
( [ ] 2, μσ=yxC ) from each probe gives an estimate on the variance of true value of 
pit depth. The measurement error for each probe can be estimated by subtracting 
the variance of true value from the variance of measured values from that 
particular probe.  
Grubbs estimates the variance of measurement error of each measuring probe 
and variance of true values of pit depths by the method of moments on the model 
described in Eq. (5.28). The variance of true value of pit depth is estimated as the 
unbiased sample covariance ( 12
2 s=μσ ) and the variance of measurement error for 









2 ss −=σ   (5.29) 
where s1, s2 are the unbiased sample variance of each measuring probe pit depths 











































































































The measurement errors estimated in Eq. (5.29) are obtained from one 
inspection sample which could differ from another inspection sample. The 
variability in estimating the measurement error 2ˆ jσ  of the j-th probe (j = 1, 2) can 






















σ μμ   (5.31) 
The variance parameters in the above equation are taken as the respective 
sample estimates. The bias parameters in Eq. (5.28) cannot be estimated unless 
the true value iμ  is known. However, the difference or the relative bias of Probe 
1 with respect to Probe 2 can be given as 
yx −=− 21 αα   (5.32) 
where x  and y  are the average of the measurements of Probe 1 and Probe 2. The 
total scatter between two probes can be decomposed into three separate 
components, the relative bias component and measurement error estimate for each 





2)Bias( σσ ++=RMSD   (5.33) 
where 21σ  and 
2
2σ  are the variances of the measurement errors of Probe 1 and 
Probe 2 respectively. 
5.7.1.3 Constrained Expected Likelihood Method 
Grubbs method can only work if the variance of the error estimates are positive, 
in case of 12
2
1 ss <  or 12
2
2 ss <  the standard deviation of ME from Eq. (5.27) 
cannot be obtained from Grubbs Method. In such situations the constrained 
expected likelihood method proposed by Jaech (1985) is used. Positive estimates 
on measurement error can be derived by finding the expected likelihood estimates 
of 21σ  and 
2
2σ , where the expectation is restricted to the space of nonnegative 
values for both the parameters. Jaech (1985) provides a maximum likelihood 
approach to Grubbs Estimates and uses the results in deriving the constrained 
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expected likelihood estimates for measurement error. The MLE of ( )2221 σσ +  is S 








1 −+−=   (5.34) 
The CEL estimators are considered such that they lie in the first quadrant on 















   (5.35) 
The CEL estimate of measurement error is then derived as the weighted 
average with respect to likelihood in the transformed space as defined in Eq. 
(5.35). The expressions for the CEL estimate of measurement error as given by 
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  (5.37) 
Morrision (2002) suggests that the CEL estimates have to be checked to see if 
they are reasonable and they also suggest that when the covariance between the 
Probes is negative the CEL estimate does not seem appropriate.   
5.8 Effect of Measurement Error and POD on Pit Depth 
Distribution 
The main objective of this section is to illustrate the effect of uncertainty in 
detectability and measurability of pit depths or flaw depths in general. The source 
of such uncertainties in eddy current inspection process is already discussed in 
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Section 5.7. This section covers the technical details in accounting for 
measurement error and probability of detection.  
The pit depths observed from eddy current inspection are associated with 
uncertainties with inspection process and tools. In addition to measurement error 
and probability of detection the pit depths are also associated with censoring. Due 
to the inherent noise from the eddy current probe, pit depths with sizes <30% 
TWD cannot be measured and hence designated as censored observations.  Such 
uncertainties on pit depth greatly effect the predictions on the leak probability 
estimates. Simulation study is conducted to quantify the effect of uncertainties in 
pit depth measurements. 
5.8.1 Simulation Analysis 
Considering that the true pit depths follows exponential distribution with mean 




























Figure 5.5: Probability density plot for true pit depth 
 The event of interest to most utilities is the probability of tube leak and the 
number of tubes plugged in a given outage. The tube leak probability is associated 
with the probability of pit depth exceeding 95% TWD. The number of tubes 
plugged is associated with the probability of pit depth exceeding 51% TWD. The 
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probability of exceedence can be calculated from Figure 5.5 by integrating the 
PDF exceeding 51% or 95% TWD. The probability of pit depth exceeding 95% 
TWD is calculated to be 0.18%, and the probability of pit depth exceeding 51% 
TWD is calculated to be 3.34%. The effect of measurement error and detection 
uncertainty is quantified in estimating the probabilities calculated above. 
5.8.1.1 Effect of Detection Uncertainty 
The uncertainty in pit detection comes from the eddy current probe resolution on 
pit sizes and also from eddy current data acquisition as described in Section 5.7. 
The uncertainty in pit detection is characterized by probability of detection (POD) 
function on pit depths. In general, pits with larger sizes can be detected with great 
certainty. The POD model quantifies the uncertainty in pit depth detection from 
eddy current inspection. The POD function considered here is the exponential 
model which is given as  
)exp(1)( xxPOD λ−−=   (5.38) 
where λ  is the parameter of the exponential POD model. The POD for pit depth 
60% TWD is considered as 95% with parameter λ = 0.05 as shown in Figure 5.6 

















Figure 5.6: Probability of Detection Plot 
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The detection probability is lower for shallow pit depths and increases with 
higher pit depths. Detection uncertainty is introduced into the true depth 
distribution to obtain detected population of pit depths. Simulation analysis is 
conducted to introduce detection uncertainty to true pit depth measurements 









  (5.39) 
where )(xf d  is the probability density of detected pits, )(xfud  is the probability 
density of undetected pits, and )(xfT  is the probability density of true pit depth 
distribution.  
True pit depth is simulated from an exponential distribution as shown in 
Figure 5.5. A Binomial random number is used to generate a detected pit depth, 
the parameter of the Binomial distribution is taken from Eq. (5.38). A large 
population of true pit depths (10 million) is simulated to obtain a sample of 
detected pit depths. The probability is obtained empirically as the fraction of 
detected sample exceeding 95% TWD to the number of detected pit depths. The 
probability of pit depth exceeding 95% TWD is calculated to be 0.4% which is 
higher than 0.18% obtained from true depth distribution. Similarly the probability 
of pit depth exceeding 51% TWD is calculated to be 7.43%. The simulation study 
indicated that the detection uncertainty on pit depths over estimates the 
probability of tube leak when compared to the true estimate of leak probability. 
The probability of pit depth exceeding 95% TWD from the undetected sample is 
conducted in the same way from a large sample (10 million) of true pit depths 
which is calculated to be very low (0.0021%). 
Since the detection uncertainty affects the leak probability estimates it is 
therefore needed to account for detection uncertainty in probability modeling. The 
detection uncertainty can be accounted for in estimating the true depth 
distribution from the detected depth distribution. The true depth distribution of 





























   (5.40) 
where )(xf d  is the probability density of detected pits and )(xfT  is the 
probability density of true pit depth distribution and k is a normalizing constant. 
























  (5.41) 
Similarly, the distribution of the undetected pit depths can be derived using 
the probability of detection concept which is given as 
( )















  (5.42) 
where )(xfud  is the probability density of undetected pits and )(xfT  is the 
probability density of true pit depth distribution and uk  is a normalizing constant. 
























  (5.43) 
Considering the detected pit depth distribution and probability of detection 
(POD) function from Eq. (5.38), the probability density function for true pit depth 
and undetected pit depths can be estimated.  
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5.8.1.2 Effect of Measurement Error 
The measured pit depths from eddy current probes are associated with 
measurement error due to uncertainties from various sources as discussed in 
Section 5.7. A simplistic model to account for measurement error (ME) is a linear 
effect model as given by 
Ε+= XY   (5.44) 
where Y is the random variable for measured pit depth, X is the random variable 
for actual pit depth, and E the measurement error variable. It is assumed that the 
measurement error is independent of actual pit depth. The measurement error is 
generally assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and a specified 
standard deviation. The measurement error of eddy current inspection probe is 
usually quantified by calibrating the measurements from sample observation of 
pulled tubes. The measurement error of inspection probes can also be quantified 
from repeat inspection data as demonstrated in Section 5.7.1. For the case of 
illustration the measurement error is assumed to follow normal distribution N(0,σ) 
with mean zero and standard deviation σ of 10% TWD.  
A random number for true pit depth is simulated from the exponential 
distribution as shown in Figure 5.5. The measured pit depth is then indicated by 
assigning a random number from normal distribution to the true pit depth. A large 
population of true pit depths (10 million) is simulated to obtain a sample of 
measured pit depths. The probability of pit depth exceeding 95% TWD is 
obtained as the fraction of measured sample exceeding 95% TWD to the sample 
size. The probability of pit depth exceeding 95% TWD is calculated to be 0.22% 
which is slightly higher than 0.18% obtained from true depth distribution. 
Similarly the probability of pit depth exceeding 51% TWD is calculated to be 
4.16%. The simulation study indicated that the effect of measurement error over 
estimates the probability of exceedences when compared to the true estimates.  
Since the measurement error effects the estimation of tube leak probability it 
therefore accounted in probability modeling. The distribution for measured pit 
depth can be derived as using the measurement error model given in Eq.(5.44). 
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The conditional distribution on measured pit depth given the distribution of actual 
pit depth can be obtained as 
)|Pr()(| xXxyyF XY =−<Ε=   (5.45) 
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  (5.47) 
The probability of observing n number of pit depths from eddy current inspection 



































σ  (5.48) 
The parameters of the likelihood function can then be estimated by 
maximizing the logarithm of likelihood function using standard maximization 
routines. The distribution of actual detected pit depth distribution can be estimated 
by likelihood method as described in this section. 
5.8.1.3  Combined Effect of Detection and Measurement Error Uncertainty  
In actual field measurement the pit depths are usually associated with detection 
uncertainty and measurement error of the eddy current inspection process. In this 
simulation study the true pit depth distribution considered in Figure 5.5 is 
introduced with probability of detection (POD) and measurement error as 
discussed in previous sections. Detection uncertainty is introduced first as the 
POD in Eq. (5.36) is defined on the true pit depth to obtain detected pit depths 
which is then introduced with measurement error. A large sample (10 million) of 
true pit depths is simulated by introducing detection uncertainty and measurement 
error to obtain a realistic sample of detected pit depths. The probability of pit 
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depth exceeding 95% TWD is obtained empirically as the fraction of detected 
sample exceeding 95% TWD to the number of detected pit depths. The 
probability of pit depth exceeding 95% TWD is calculated to be 0.51% which is 
higher than 0.18% obtained from true depth distribution. Similarly the probability 




























































Figure 5.8: Effect of pit depth uncertainties on probability of pit depth exceeding 
51% TWD 
The effect of pit depth uncertainties on estimating the probability of 
exceeding 95 % TWD is shown in Figure 5.7. The results indicate that the 
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uncertainty in detection (POD) and measurement error (ME) over estimates the 
true estimate of the probability of exceedences. It is therefore required to account 
for measurement error and probability of detection on pit depths in probability 
modeling.  
5.8.2 Remarks 
The event of interest in the context of life cycle management is the probability of 
tube leak which results in forced outage and the number of tubes plugging. In 
order to estimate the tube leak probability from eddy current inspection data it is 
required to account for uncertainties in pit depth measurements. In this section a 
simulation study is conducted to estimate the effect of uncertainties in pit depths 
towards estimation of probability of pit depth exceeding 95% or 51% TWD.  The 
results indicate that the measurement error and detection uncertainties over 
estimate the exceedence probabilities when compared to the estimate from true pit 
depth distribution. The uncertainties in pit depth measurements are therefore 
needed to account for in probability modeling. The section also discusses the 
probability models in accounting for such uncertainties in estimating the true pit 
depth distribution. 
5.9 Inspection Uncertainty in Modeling Pitting Corrosion of 
Steam Generators 
Due to costs involved in eddy current inspection of SG tubes it is not economical 
to conduct frequent inspections. Usually the SG tubes are either partially 
inspected every 2-4 years or more frequently depending on the extent of aging SG 
tubes. Such situations limit the amount of data required to model the random 
pitting process of a particular SG. The detected pit depths from eddy current 
inspections are also associated with probability of detection, measurement error 
and censoring of pit depths. Corrosion pits with depth ≤ 30% TWD cannot be 
measured accurately due to inherent noise in eddy current probes and therefore 
indicated as censored pit depths. Such uncertainties in inspection process hinder 
the estimation of realistic tube leak probability. 
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5.9.1 Simulation Analysis 
The standard practice in industry is to plan a scheduled outage every two years. 
For a reactor unit the number of SGs inspected usually depends on the extent of 
degradation in SGs. For the simulation study conducted in this section the reactor 
unit is considered to have 12 SGs each experiencing similar pitting corrosion 
degradation process. Hence the data from the SGs inspected are grouped to model 
the uncertainty in corrosion pitting process for a single SG. The objective of this 
study is to quantify the uncertainty in estimating the tube leak probability and 
number of tubes plugged per SG under different inspection plans. The inspection 
plans considered are the number of SGs (3, 6, 9, and 12) inspected every two 
years.  
The analysis considers a known pit generation process for a particular SG in 
estimating the probability of tube leak in the next outage from the pit depth data 
obtained from simulation. The pit occurrence follows a Poisson distribution with 
mean rate following Weibull power law rate as discussed in Section 5.2.2. The 
parameters for the SG pit generation model per SG are taken as 1.382 as scale (α) 
and 2.5 as scale parameter (β) to reflect the actual observation from industry. 
Assuming the process starts at year 0, the mean rate of pitting in an interval [0 t] 
























Figure 5.9: Mean pit occurrence rate plot 
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Using the Pit occurrence rate from Figure 5.9 and considering the true pit 
depth distribution from Section 5.8 the extreme pit depth model from Section 5.4 
is applied to estimate the mean occurrence rate of extreme pits (Eq. 5.12) and the 
expected annual leak probability (Eq. 5.14) as described in Section 5.4. The tube 
leak probability in next outage is calculated by considering the leak criterion (z) 























Figure 5.10: Probability of tube leak in next outage 
The probability of tube leak predicted in next outage is shown in Figure 5.10 
at each inspection outage for a period of 16 years using true pit depth distribution. 
The probability of tube leak prediction in outage years 2-4 is calculated as 2.5% at 
outage year 2 as shown in Figure 5.10. Simulation study is conducted by 
introducing the detection uncertainty and measurement error on pit depths. The 
results from the analysis are then compared to the probability of tube leak in next 





























Figure 5.11: Expected number of tubes plugged in next outage 
Similarly the expected number of tubes plugged predicted in next outage is shown 
in Figure 5.11 at each inspection outage for a period of 16 years. The results from 
the simulation analysis are then compared to the expected number of tubes 
plugged in next outage calculated from true pit depth distribution as shown in 
Figure 5.11. 
5.9.1.1 Procedure 
The inspection plans are designated as plans 1-4 for inspecting 3, 6, 9, and 12 SGs 
at each inspection outage. Under an inspection plan the pit generation is simulated 
using the model shown in Figure 5.9 for a period of 16 years. Since pit depth is a 
random variable, the pit depths are simulated from a true pit depth distribution as 
shown in Figure 5.5. Probability of detection and measurement error uncertainty 
is then introduced as discussed in Section 5.8.1 to obtain a realistic detected 
sample in each outage. The detected pit depth sample is then grouped from all 
SGs from all previous inspection outages to estimate the pit depth distribution and 
pit generation rate. The pit depth distribution is assumed to follow exponential 
where the distribution parameter is estimated from maximum likelihood method 
to account for censored sample with pit depth ≤ 30% TWD. A flow chart of the 
simulation analysis procedure is shown in Figure 5.12. The probability of tube 
leak and the number of tubes plugged for the next outage per SG are estimated at 
each inspection outage. 
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Figure 5.12: Flow chart on simulation analysis procedure 
Under each inspection plan 10000 simulations are conducted to obtain the 
statistics on the estimate of tube leak probability and number of tubes plugged at 
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next outage. The results on probability of tube leak prediction from simulation 
analysis are shown in Figures 5.13-5.16. 





























Figure 5.13: Probability of tube leak prediction in next outage under inspection 
plan 1 





























Figure 5.14: Probability of tube leak prediction in next outage under inspection 
plan 2 
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Figure 5.15: Probability of tube leak prediction in next outage under inspection 
plan 3 





























Figure 5.16: Probability of tube leak prediction in next outage under inspection 
plan 4 
The obvious result from Figures 5.13-5.16 is that, the more the number of 
SGs inspected the lesser is the sampling uncertainty in estimating the leak 
probability estimate. The results indicate that inspecting more than 6 SGs at each 
outage provide reasonable estimates on probability of tube leak predictions. Since 
the uncertainty in estimating the leak probability is mostly from the number of pit 
depth measurements recorded. The results from simulation analysis in Figures 
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5.13-5.16 indicate that the uncertainty in eddy current inspection of pit depths 
greatly bias the estimate on leak probability. The results indicate that the 
uncertainty in pit depth measurements result in over estimating the leak 
probability estimate until around year 10 and under estimating the true leak 
probability estimate in the later years.  
The results on predicting the number of tubes plugged from simulation 
analysis are shown in Figures 5.17-5.20. 


























Figure 5.17: Number of tubes plugged predicted in next outage under inspection 
plan 1 
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Figure 5.18: Number of tubes plugged predicted in next outage under inspection 
plan 2 


























Figure 5.19: Number of tubes plugged predicted in next outage under inspection 
plan 3 
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Figure 5.20: Number of tubes plugged predicted in next outage under inspection 
plan 4 
The sampling uncertainty in predicting the number of tubes plugged in the 
next outages decreases with the number of SGs inspected as shown Figures 5.17-
5.20. But the sampling uncertainty in predicting the number of tubes plugged is 
not significant when compared to the results from leak probability predictions. 
The uncertainties in pit depth measurements over estimate the prediction of 
number of tubes plugged in next outage when compared to exact predictions from 
true pit depth distribution. 
5.9.2 Remarks 
The prediction of probability of tube leak in next outage is greatly biased by 
uncertainties in eddy current inspection of pit depths as shown in Figure 5.21. 
This result is independent of inspection plans considered. The uncertainties in pit 
depth measurements over estimate the probability of tube leak prediction in next 
outage until around 10 years, and under estimate the leak probability prediction in 
the later years when compared to the leak probability estimate from true depth 
distribution. The effect of sampling uncertainty for different inspection plans 
towards probability of leak predictions is shown in Figure 5.22. The sampling 
uncertainty decreases as more data is collected in each outage. The increase in 
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COV in later years as shown in Figure 5.22 is due to the expected value of leak 






































Figure 5.22: COV in leak probability prediction for different inspection plans 
The prediction on number of tubes plugged in not greatly biased by 
uncertainties in eddy current inspection of pit depths as shown in Figure 5.23.  
The uncertainties in pit depths over estimate the prediction on number of tubes 
plugged in next outage at in later years of inspection. The sampling uncertainty in 
inspection plans is not very significant in prediction of number of plugged tubes 




















































Figure 5.24: COV in number of tubes plugged under different inspection plans 
5.10 Conclusions 
An overview of life cycle management issues in steam generators of nuclear 
power plants is discussed. There is a need for efficient life cycle management 
decisions based on the current degradation of SGs. Probabilistic modelling of 
steam generator degradation mechanisms provides a great tool for quantifying the 
uncertainties in degradation and for modelling optimal maintenance decisions.  
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In the case of steam generator pitting corrosion, the rate of pit generation is 
modeled as a non-homogeneous Poisson process which falls into the class of 
stochastic birth process model. The pitting activity is observed during various 
outages of the plant’s history by the use of eddy current inspection. The 
parameters of the pit generation process are estimated by taking into account both 
censored observations and non-censored observations. The pit depth distribution 
exceeding a threshold pit depth is modeled as the generalized Pareto distribution 
(GPD), which falls into the class of extreme value distribution. The generation of 
extreme pits also follows Poisson process, with pit depth distribution following 
GPD which can be characterized as a marked point process.  
The results are presented from the stochastic model in estimating the 
expected number of extreme pits and the annual leak probability during future 
operation crucial for steam generator life management decision modelling. Some 
results on probability of first leak or nth leak can be applicable to steam generator 
fitness for service assessments and life cycle management planning.  
The effect of measurement error and detection uncertainty in eddy current 
inspections on measured defect depths is presented from simulation results. The 
results indicate that the measurement error and detection uncertainties 
overestimate the exceedence probabilities compared with the estimate from true 
pit depth distribution. The probability models provide a framework in quantifying 
the uncertainties and in estimating the true defect distribution models. The 
probability model on true defect distribution is needed for a realistic estimate of 
the uncertainty in pitting corrosion degradation of steam generators.  
The effects of uncertainties in the eddy current inspection process for a 
reactor unit are demonstrated through a simulation study. Pitting corrosion 
degradation in each SG is simulated from a known stochastic model for a period 
of 16 years. The pit depth measurements are introduced with uncertainties from 
detection and measurement error. The censoring in pit depths is considered in 
estimating the pit depth distribution from simulated observations due to threshold 
limits on measuring pit depth from eddy current probes. The parameters of the 
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stochastic model are estimated by grouping the data from all SGs at an inspection 
outage to predict the probability of leak and the number of tubes plugged in next 
outage.  
The prediction of the probability of tube leaks in next outage is greatly biased 
by uncertainties in eddy current inspection of pit depths. The uncertainties in pit 
depth measurements overestimate the probability of tube leak prediction in next 
outage until around 10 years, and underestimate the leak probability prediction for 
the later years compared with the leak probability estimate from true depth 
distribution. The prediction on number of tubes plugged in not greatly biased by 
uncertainties in eddy current inspection of pit depths. The uncertainties in pit 
depths overestimate the prediction on number of tubes plugged in next outage in 
later years of inspection. However, the sampling uncertainty in inspection plans is 
not very significant in predicting the number of plugged tubes. 
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CHAPTER 6  
STEAM GENERATOR LCM APPLICATION 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous chapter discuss the pitting corrosion model and estimation methods 
applicable to steam generator life cycle management. This chapter deals with 
actual field inspection data obtained from industry. The application and benefits 
of the model are illustrated in the context of lifecycle management of a steam 
generator. Optimization on the chemical cleaning cycle of a SG is presented. 
6.2 Data Analysis 
The probabilistic modelling of pitting corrosion in this chapter is based on the 
reported results from eddy current inspection of several steam generators at a 
nuclear generating station. The SGs considered in this study have undergone two 
separate water lancing and chemical cleaning (WL/CC) campaigns in a period of 
approximately eight years. Therefore, only data between two WL/CC campaigns 
(i.e maintenance interval) will be used.  
Only pits greater than or equal to 50% through-wall depth (TWD) observed 
during maintenance interval is considered for extreme pit generation model. There 
is less uncertainty in the detection of these deeper pits, and also higher confidence 
in the reported depths. Furthermore, deeper pits have higher significance in the 
context of steam generator LCM with regards to tube plugging and potential for 
through-wall penetration. 
The database provided by industry consists of 122 pits ≥ 50% TWD, and 
their distribution is shown in Figure 6.1. Due to similar operating environment the 



















Figure 6.1: Distribution of pit sizes ≥ 50% TWD 
The number of new pits generated gradually increases with the time of 
inspection, as shown in Figure 6.2. An increase over time is also related with the 


















Figure 6.2: Generation of new pits during different inspection outages 
6.2.1 Model Parameter Estimation 
6.2.1.1 Estimation of the Pit Generation Rate 
The pit generation rate is estimated from maximum likelihood method as 
described in Section 5.3 following Poisson process. The maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters of the Poisson models are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Parameters of the pit generation process 
Model Parameters Estimate Standard Error 
Homogeneous Poisson 
Process (HPP) Mean Rate (λ) 0.373 0.034 
Shape (β) 4.526 0.530 Non-Homogeneous 
Poisson Process (NHPP) Scale (α) 0.0014 0.0014 
 
The sampling uncertainty in estimating the mean rate function of the NHPP 

























Figure 6.3: Mean rate function of NHPP process of pit generation in a SG 
The likelihood ratio statistic (LRS) as described in Section 5.3.1 is conducted 
to the test for HPP. An LRS = 119.6 is obtained from the likelihood analysis for 
which the p-value is zero.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 % 
level of significance, and it is concluded that the pit generation rate is not constant 
in time and does not follow the homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP). 
6.2.1.2 Estimation of the Pit Depth Distribution 
From the pit data (Figure 6.1) the parameters of the generalized Pareto model are 





Table 6.2: Parameters of the pit depth distribution 
Method Shape (ξ) Scale (σ) (% TWD) 
Threshold (u) 
(% TWD) 



















Figure 6.4: The GPD probability paper plot of the pit depth data 
The goodness of fit of the GPD model is investigated using the probability paper 








ξ   (6.1) 
The X-axis of the plot is defined as Log(1- FX(x)) = Log(q(x)) and the Y-axis 
as Log(1- g(x)), where g(x) = ξ(x - u)/σ. The sample data are plotted along these 
axes, as shown in Figure 6.4.  The R2 value of 0.98 confirms that the GPD model 
provides a good fit to the data. 
6.3 Model Application 
Assessing the risk associated with tube leakage and the exceedance of the tube 
plugging margin in the next operating period are important considerations for 
steam generator life-cycle management.  The proposed probabilistic model for 
pitting corrosion can be used to answer these questions.  
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6.3.1 Probability of Tube Leak 
Operational experience and other evidence suggest that a corrosion pit may leak 
when its depth is of the order of 95 % TWD.  Therefore, the probability of tube 
leakage per SG in a time interval (0 - t) can be computed from the extreme value 
distribution (Eq. 5.14) for z = 95%. 
As shown by the results in Figure 6.5, the probability of tube leakage in the 
early years in a SG is negligible, but it increases rapidly in later years, exceeding 





















Figure 6.5: Annual probability of tube leakage in a SG 

























Figure 6.6: Expected number of plugged tubes  
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From the proposed model, the average number of tubes to be plugged in an 8-
year interval is estimated as 3.5 tubes per SG using Eq. (5.12).  Note that the 
plugging limit is assumed to be equal to 51 % TWD. The sampling uncertainty in 
estimating the expected number of tubes plugged is shown in Figure 6.6. In fact, 
the distribution of the number of tubes plugged in an 8 year interval follows the 
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Figure 6.7: Distribution of the number of tubes plugged per SG 
6.3.3 Time to Leak 
Based on the results from pit generation rate and pit depth distribution, the time to 
leak as discussed in Section 5.6 can be estimated. Considering z = 95 %TWD as 
leak criterion, Eq. (5.23) gives the survival distribution for time to first leak.  























































Figure 6.9: Probability density function plot for time to first leak 
The survival probability plot is shown in Figure 6.8 along with probability 
density function plot as shown in Figure 6.9. The expected time to first leak is 
calculated from Eq. (5.21) as 16.1 years. 
Similarly considering x = 51 %TWD as plugging criterion, Eq. (5.23) gives 
the probability distribution for the first time to meet plugging criterion. The 
expected time to first failure /SG can be calculated from Eq. (5.21), the results are 




Table 6.3: Expected time to first failure per SG 
Failure Event Pit Depth (Criterion) 
Expected time to 
first failure 
Leak 95 % TWD 16.1 Years 
Plugging 51 % TWD 5.5 Years 
 
Considering z = 95 %TWD as leak criterion, Eq. (5.26) gives the probability 
distribution for time to nth leak. Considering z = 51 %TWD as plugging criterion, 
Eq. (5.26) gives the probability distribution for the time to n tubes plugged. The 
expected time to nth failure per SG is shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Expected time to nth failure per SG 
Event nth Failure Pit Depth (Criterion) 
Expected time to 
nth failure 
Leak 3rd leak 95 22.3 Years 
Plugging 20 tubes 51 12.2 Years 
Plugging 40 tubes 51 14.2 Years 
 
6.4 Measurement Error Analysis from Field Inspections 
6.4.1 Data Summary 
The corrosion pit data observed during inspection outages from a nuclear 
generating station of steam generator using probes C1, C2, and X. The measuring 
probes in order of increasing resolution are C1<C2<X, where the X-probe is the 
latest addition in SG tube inspection due to higher resolution and characterization 
of flaws as discussed in Section 5.1.1.2. The pit depths measured by at least two 
probes in an inspection outage are paired for the analysis discussed in Section 
5.7.1.2. Most of the observations from C1 probe are censored and hence not 
considered in the analysis. The data from all the SGs of a nuclear generating 
station are grouped together for the analysis of probe measurement error as 
described in Section 5.7.1. 
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6.4.2 Statistical Analysis 
6.4.2.1 C2 Probe and X Probe 
X probe is recently introduced in SG tube inspection whereas C2 has been used 
for many years. The repeat observations from these two probes are 191 pit depths 
and are non-censored observations. The plot on all pit indications from C2 and X 
is shown in Figure 6.10 along with linear regression estimate.  
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Figure 6.10: Repeat measurement on pit depth from C2 and X probe 
Most of the data is populated around pit depths <30%tw, the plot also shows 
a good linear fit with R2 of 0.7. The results from statistical analysis as described in 
Section 5.7.1 is summarised in Table below 














C2  27.9 254.9 8.5 11 
X  23.1 150.6 
164.8 4.8 9.9 
1.7 8.2 
 
In practice the RMSD of 9.9%tw between C2 and X probe is assigned to bad 
probe. Actually the RMSD is contributed from the uncertainties in both probes as 
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well as bias in measuring the actual pit depths. The constrained expected 
likelihood (CEL) method is used to quantify the measurement error in each probe. 
The measurement error is 8.5 %TWD on C2 and 1.7 %TWD on X probe 
respectively. The standard error in estimating the measurement error is large as 
shown in Table 6.5. The sampling uncertainty can be minimized with collection 
of more data. 
6.5 Steam Generator LCM Model 
6.5.1 Life Cycle Costing 
All future costs of maintaining equipment are calculated in present value terms 
















100/1   (6.3) 
Where Ci is the cost incurred in year i, k% & d% are the inflation and discount 
rates. The net present value as given in Eq. (6.3) is the amount of money to be 
invested at the present time to pay the future costs incurred during a period of T 
years. The inflation rate is not considered in this section ( %0=k ). 
This approach is generally accepted in power industries to compare various 
alternating course of actions over a range of future years. Life cycle costing 
usually involves optimizing maintenance decisions which is done by minimizing 
the expected value of NPV. 
Attention should be paid in reviewing and planning maintenance models to 
ensure that costs associated with maintenance and those resulting from failures 
are properly reflected. The costs associated with maintenance are usually the 
planned preventive maintenance activities and the unplanned corrective 
maintenance actions resulting from unexpected failures. Unexpected failures also 
results in value of lost production and other consequential costs from failure. All 
such costs are important to include in the maintenance model to ensure that the 
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best policy is not just minimizing the maintenance cost but in maximizing the 
value of the asset.  
6.5.2 SG LCM Costing 
To extend the life of steam generators utilities adopt various life management 
strategies. To compare the merit of such life management strategies the net 
present value approach as discussed in the preceding section is applied. The 
current life management strategy in industry is to implement preventive 
maintenance action like water lancing for every 4 years and chemical cleaning for 
every 8 years to mitigate pitting corrosion degradation of steam generators.  
The SG tube leakage due to tube pitting results in an unexpected plant outage 
and various consequential costs due to tube leak. Corrective maintenance cost due 
to tube leak is associated with the number of tube leaks (forced outages) in a 
given period. The expected NPV of corrective maintenance cost in the time period 





)exp()()( λ   (6.4) 
where ()Zλ  is the intensity function of number of tube leaks assuming leak 
criterion TWD%95=z  and fc  is the cost of failure per outage due to tube leak. 
The failure costs include loss of revenue due to outage, tube plugging costs, 
additional inspection cost of SG tubes etc.  
Preventive maintenance costs are fixed costs associated with the number of 
inspections and chemical cleaning campaigns on SGs. The periodic inspection on 
SG tubes doesn’t affect the corrosion pitting process whereas the chemical 
cleaning actions mitigates corrosion pitting and the pitting process starts fresh (i.e 
the intensity function ()Zλ  starts from zero). The net present value of total cost of 
SG maintenance )(tC  in time period [0 t] is given as 
)()()( tCtCtC CMPM +=   (6.5) 
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where CPM(t) & CCM(t) are the preventive maintenance and corrective 
maintenance costs in time period [0 t]. The NPV as calculated from Eq. (6.5) can 
be used in evaluating various preventive maintenance actions to be conducted on 
the steam generator life management program. 
6.5.2.1 Illustrative Example 
In this section the pitting corrosion problem as discussed in Section 6.2 is 
considered. The probabilistic pitting corrosion model developed in Section 6.2.1 
is used in the cost model. The input data for the cost model is summarised in the 
Table 6.6.  
Table 6.6: Input data for cost model per SG 
Input Data Value 
Discount Rate (d) 5% 
Inflation Rate (k) 0% 
Inspection Cost $20K every 2 years 
Chemical Cleaning (PM) Cost $100K every 8 years
Corrective Maintenance Cost (cf) $1000K/outage 
Forecast Period 24 Years 
 
The maintenance costs considered as in Table 6.6 are assumed as fixed costs 
and are not time dependent. In this section implementing chemical cleaning action 
every 8 years for SG based on the Net Present Value approach is discussed. It is 
assumed that with each chemical cleaning action the pitting corrosion degradation 
is mitigated and the pitting process starts fresh again with SG usage.  
The total expected maintenance cost in NPV as calculated from Eq. (6.3) is 
shown in Figure 6.11 & Figure 6.12 with and without chemical cleaning over a 
forecast period of 24 years. The plot shows a histogram of total costs showing 
both corrective and preventive maintenance costs. With chemical cleaning as 
shown in Figure 6.11, there is an abrupt increase in cost due to chemical cleaning 
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at 8th year and 16th year of operation. The chemical cleaning actions although 
resulting in high maintenance costs in that particular year of action reduces 
significantly the expected corrective maintenance costs in subsequent years. For 
the case without chemical cleaning as shown in Figure 6.12 the expected 





















































Figure 6.12: Expected total costs in NPV without Chemical Cleaning 
The cumulative cost of maintenance at the end of forecast period of 24 years in 
NPV is summarised in the Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Expected total Maintenance Cost in NPV over a forecast period of 24 
years 
Decision NPV 
Chemical Cleaning every 8 years $283 K 
Without Chemical Cleaning $1521 K
 
The results in Table 6.7, show that the SG maintenance with chemical cleaning 
actions conducted every 8 years results in much lower total expected costs based 
on NPV over a forecast period of 24 years.  
6.5.3 Maintenance Optimization 
The NPV approach as discussed in preceding section is used to optimize the 
frequency of chemical cleaning. Frequent chemical cleaning actions may reduce 
the risk of tube leakage greatly due to pitting corrosion but the maintenance costs 
will be much higher. On the other hand deferring the chemical cleaning actions 
may reduce the high maintenance costs but results in high risk of tube leakage 
which could result in high corrective maintenance costs. Considering the effect of 
chemical cleaning on reducing the tube leak probabilities, it is shown that 
chemical cleaning actions every 8 years lead to less maintenance cost in NPV 
over a forecast period of 24 years. Similar calculations as done in Section 6.5.2.1 
are conducted by changing the frequency of chemical cleaning actions. The effect 
of chemical cleaning cycle on the overall NPV of maintenance over a forecast 
























) Forecast Period 
of 24 Years
 
Figure 6.13: NPV of Maintenance cost Vs Chemical Cleaning Cycles 
Interestingly, the optimal cleaning cycle shown in Figure 6.13 is 8 years 
which results in least expected total cost. The optimum chemical cleaning cycle of 
8 years is sensitive to the input cost data considered which could vary on the 
choice of maintenance actions and cost estimates. The discount rate has no effect 
on optimum cleaning cycle of 8 years.  
6.6 Conclusions 
The application of the pitting corrosion model to actual field inspection data 
obtained from industry is presented. The data from industry is associated with 
uncertainties in the inspection process and in measuring and detecting pit depths. 
This fact makes it difficult to develop realistic probability models. Pit depths 
exceeding 50% TWD is considered for the analysis so that the uncertainties with 
detection and measurement are minimized. Pitting corrosion process within the 
maintenance interval of 8 years between cleaning campaigns is considered for the 
analysis. The data from all units of the nuclear generating station are pooled as 
one sample to model the stochastic pit generation of a SG.  
The application of the proposed probabilistic model for pitting corrosion 
degradation in SG LCM is presented. The model can be used to predict the 
probability of tube leak and expected number of tubes plugged during the next 
operating period. The model can also be applied to predict the probability 
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distribution of time to first leak. The expected time to the nth leak or nth plugging 
can also be estimated from the model. 
The measurement error of eddy current probes from field inspection is 
presented. The traditional approach in industry is to use RMSD to quantify 
measurement error, which assigns measurement error to the bad probe. Actually, 
the RMSD embodies uncertainties in both probes as well as bias in measuring the 
actual pit depths. The Grubbs method and CEL methods are used to quantify the 
measurement error in each probe. Measurement error analysis is conducted on the 
repeat inspection data from a nuclear generating station of pit depth 
measurements from C2 and X probe. The CEL method is used to quantify the 
measurement error in each probe. The measurement error is calculated as 8.5% 
TWD on C2 probe and 1.7% TWD on X probe respectively. 
The steam generator LCM model for pitting corrosion degradation is 
presented. The effect of chemical cleaning interval on expected total costs over a 
forecast period is illustrated using the NPV approach. Maintenance optimization 
on a chemical cleaning cycle for SG pitting corrosion degradation is demonstrated. 
The pitting corrosion model for a SG estimated from actual plant data is 
considered for maintenance optimization. The optimum cleaning cycle is 
calculated to be 8 years for the cost data considered. The discount rate has no 
effect on an optimum cleaning cycle of 8 years.  
The main contribution of the thesis is the application of stochastic pitting 




CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
The thesis presents application of probabilistic models to support risk-based life 
cycle management of energy infrastructure systems. Statistical techniques to 
analyze incomplete, censored and truncated data collected from inspection of 
components in the energy industry are addressed. The thesis presents detailed 
practical applications of LCM models to energy systems and discusses the 
practical difficulties associated with remaining lifetime prediction. 
Probabilistic models for asset management of infrastructure components in 
estimating the life cycle costs associated with component replacement are 
investigated. Age-based replacement policy is simple and effective to implement 
in a system with a large population of relatively inexpensive components. A 
sequential inspection-based replacement model is proposed to manage 
components from a large distribution network. The proposed model has a 
significant potential in minimizing the maintenance cost, risk, and improving the 
asset management of distribution network components. 
A probabilistic lifetime model is proposed to consider the effect of imperfect 
preventive maintenance on systems and components. The model has the 
flexibility to incorporate the imperfections of maintenance actions using the 
concept of virtual age. The results show that imperfect preventive maintenance 
increases optimal total costs and the frequency of optimal maintenance intervals.  
The limitation of the work presented in the thesis is that the optimal 
maintenance actions are based on life cycle cost estimates only. Although the 
parameters of the model can be updated with availability of more data, Bayesian 
updating is not considered in the thesis.  
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A stochastic model for the pitting corrosion process in a SG is proposed. The 
occurrence of large pits is modeled as a non-homogeneous Poisson process. The 
pit depth distribution exceeding a threshold pit depth is modeled as the 
generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), which falls into the class of extreme value 
distribution. The model can be applied in estimating the expected number of 
extreme pits and the annual leak probability during future operation crucial for 
steam generator life management decision modelling.  
The effect of measurement error and detection uncertainty in eddy current 
inspections on measured defect depths is investigated from simulation results. The 
results indicate that the measurement error and detection uncertainties 
overestimate the exceedence probabilities compared with the estimate from true 
pit depth distribution. The probability models developed provide a framework in 
quantifying the uncertainties in estimating the true defect distribution models.  
The effect of uncertainties in the eddy current inspection process in 
predicting tube leak probability and number of tubes plugged in next outage is 
investigated through a simulation study under different inspection plans. The 
prediction of the probability of tube leaks in next outage is greatly biased by 
uncertainties in pit depths.  
The uncertainties in pit depth measurements overestimate the probability of 
tube leak prediction in next outage during initial period of operation, and 
underestimate the leak probability prediction for the later years when compared to 
the leak probability estimate from true depth distribution. The uncertainties in pit 
depths also overestimate the prediction on number of tubes plugged in next outage 
at later years of inspection. The sampling uncertainty under different inspection 
plans is significant for tube leak predictions but is not that significant in 
prediction of number of tubes plugged. 
The thesis presents the practical application of stochastic model for pitting 
corrosion degradation in steam generator tubing. The application and benefits of 
the model are illustrated in the context of a steam generator life cycle 
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management. The model presents a significant potential in optimizing the 
chemical cleaning cycle for a steam generator life cycle management. 
Although the methodology presented in the thesis is based on illustrative case 
studies, they are generic, and therefore applicable to other component LCM in 
energy infrastructure. The probabilistic models developed in this thesis help 
engineers in the energy industry to quantify uncertainties in inspection data and 
provide a framework for practical application of probabilistic models towards life 
cycle management decisions. 
7.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
The thesis work is a part of broad research that focuses on developing a risk based 
approach to life cycle management of energy infrastructure systems. Various 
research issues related to development of probabilistic models in the context of 
inspection of equipment, data acquisition, degradation modelling, maintenance 
alternatives, and cost models are relevant.   
Although the thesis addresses issues in estimating the lifetime distribution 
models from incomplete observations it does not deal with covariate data. The 
variables affecting the equipment lifetimes (covariates) are important and there is 
a need for advanced statistical techniques to account for covariates in estimating 
equipment lifetime.  
Maintenance models discussed in this thesis is based on a single component 
in a distribution network. Maintenance model for systems with different 
component lifetimes is another research area which has a great potential in energy 
infrastructure systems. The cost data for maintenance models in the thesis are 
considered as constants. It is difficult to get actual costs from industry, therefore 
there is a need for better cost models which takes into account the uncertainties in 
cost estimates.  
The Gamma frailty Poisson model (Negative Binomial Process) as discussed 
in chapter 5 takes into account large variability in pitting process among SGs 
which is not investigated in this thesis. Further research work is needed to 
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investigate if it is a better model for pitting corrosion degradation and its practical 
implementation in SG LCM. 
The practical application of the proposed stochastic modelling for pitting 
corrosion to other degradation mechanisms in other nuclear components could be 
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